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THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17
 The most critical problem for the Western Allies in the northern European theater in 1941–42 was the urgent need to secure the war matériel being sent 
to the Soviet Union. Initially, the Germans did not react strongly against the Al-
lied convoys sailing to northern Russia. However, that began to change quickly 
after February 1942, when the Germans redeployed almost all their heavy surface 
forces and a large number of U-boats from home waters to northern Norway. At-
tacks by the German Luftwaffe and U-boats became not only more intensive but 
increasingly deadly. Correspondingly, the Allied 
convoys suffered ever-larger losses.
Because there were no prospects for opening a 
second front in 1942, it was vitally important for 
the Western Allies to keep the Soviet Union in the 
war; otherwise victory over Nazi Germany would 
be impossible. Hence, all efforts were made to 
supply Russia with increasing amounts of war ma-
tériel. However, the Western Allies faced serious 
difficulties in supplying Russia. The routes that of-
fered the shortest transit times were also the most 
dangerous. The Western Allies had three main 
alternatives: (1) across the Pacific to Vladivos tok; 
(2) across the southern Atlantic and around the 
Cape of Good Hope to the port of Basra in the 
Persian Gulf (called the “Persian Corridor”); and 
(3) across the northern Atlantic to Iceland and 
then to the north Russian ports of Arkhangelsk 
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and Murmansk (the Arctic route). Each of these routes had advantages and 
disadvantages. (1) The Pacific route to Vladivostok passed near northern Hok-
kaido. Hence, after Japan opened hostilities with the United States and Britain 
in December 1941, it could be used only by Soviet-flag ships. Plus, adding the 
distance from Russia’s Pacific coast to the front lines in the west, this route was 
the longest of the three. (2) Shipping from U.S. east coast ports had to go via the 
Cape of Good Hope until July 1943, when the Mediterranean route was opened. 
The Cape route was about 14,500 miles long and required some seventy-six days 
to transit.1 (3) The shortest but the most dangerous route was the Arctic option. 
The Germans proffered a serious threat to Allied ships by using the Luftwaffe, 
U-boats, and heavy surface ships based in northern Norway. The Allied problem 
was made worse by the very poor sailing conditions caused by extreme cold, bad 
weather, and ice. Despite all these difficulties, the Soviets adamantly insisted on 
use of the northern route because it could deliver badly needed war matériel 
more quickly and closer to their forces at the front. Another possible reason was 
Soviet fear of too strong an Anglo-American presence in Persia.2 The decision 
to establish the Arctic route was made by British prime minister Winston S. 
Churchill (1874–1965), with the full support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(1882–1945).3 Admiral Sir Dudley Pound (1877–1943), the British First Sea 
Lord (1939–43), and Admiral Sir John Tovey (1885–1971), commander in chief 
(CINC) of the Home Fleet, were opposed to that decision.4
The single most devastating action in the resupply effort was the German attack 
on Convoy PQ17 in July 1942. The Luftwaffe and U-boats sank twenty-two out of 
thirty-six merchant ships plus one out of three rescue ships during the weeklong 
attacks. The planned augmentation of this effort in the form of a foray (code-named 
Unternehmen [Operation] RÖSSELSPRUNG) by the battleship Tirpitz and other 
heavy surface ships was short-lived in execution because Allied forces detected 
the German ships prematurely. Nevertheless, the Germans achieved a significant 
victory against the Allies’ efforts to supply their embattled Russian ally. In the 
aftermath, all convoys to Russia via the Arctic route were suspended for almost 
two months; the next convoy did not sail until 2 September 1942. During the next 
two years, convoys ran only during the long, dark months of winter. This resulted 
in much smaller losses than in 1942; subsequently, only four ships were lost, three 
in 1944 and one in March 1945.5
In operational terms, the German attack against Convoy PQ17 was a major 
naval/joint operation vs. enemy maritime trade. For the Allies, the defense of Con-
voy PQ17 amounted to a major naval/joint operation to defend maritime trade. 
Strategically, this operation was an integral part of the Allies’ efforts to defend 
and preserve their military-economic potential at sea, while the Germans’ objec-
tive was to destroy it.
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STRATEGIC SETTING
At the turn of 1941–42, the strategic situation for the Western Allies in the Eu-
ropean theater was very unfavorable. The Germans controlled the entire coast of 
Western Europe from northern Norway to the Franco-Spanish border in the Bay 
of Biscay. However, the Germans suffered a series of setbacks in the fall of 1941 
and early winter of 1941/42 on the eastern front. Their forces were stopped at the 
gates of Leningrad (Saint Petersburg today) and Moscow and in southern Russia. 
They were forced to retreat in the battle of Moscow (2 October 1941–7 January 
1942). Yet despite these reverses, the Wehrmacht’s power was not broken.
Germany’s invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 radically changed 
the strategic situation in the northern area in Germany’s favor. By obtaining 
control of the Jutland Peninsula / Danish Straits and Norway, Germany greatly 
weakened Britain’s strategic position in the northern area. This loss was some-
what ameliorated by the Anglo-American occupation of Iceland in June 1941; 
this greatly improved the Allies’ ability to control surrounding sea areas within 
the effective range of their land-based aircraft. They were also able to carry out 
raids against the German-controlled Norwegian coast.6
By controlling Norway, the Germans made it impossible for the British to 
blockade the Shetlands–southern Norway line, as had happened in World War I 
(when Britain and the United States established the Northern Barrage minefield). 
Germany also greatly weakened the British position in the Shetland–Faeroes– 
Iceland gap. Passage through the northern portion of the North Sea was opened 
up for German naval forces.7 Control of the Norwegian coast significantly im-
proved the effectiveness of the Kriegsmarine (navy) and Luftwaffe (air force) in 
their attacks on enemy maritime traffic in the northern Atlantic Ocean and the 
Barents Sea.
Nazi Germany also greatly benefited economically from controlling Norway. 
Among other things, the Germans obtained control of some commodities impor-
tant to their war industries, including aluminum, copper, paper, and timber. Ger-
many also gained more secure export of Swedish iron ore through Narvik.8 Along 
the 1,745–nautical mile (nm)–long route from Oslo in the south to Kirkenes 
beyond North Cape, some two hundred thousand tons of shipping moved every 
day. At the same time, the political situation in Norway was difficult for the Ger-
mans. The Germans realized that the majority of the populace was pro-British. 
These Norwegians hoped for a British victory, and that the Germans and Soviets 
would exhaust themselves in the war.9
Hitler placed great strategic importance on Germany’s continued control of 
Norway. He was extremely concerned about the possibility of enemy landings 
there. Hitler’s views were shared by Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), CINC 
of the Kriegsmarine and the Naval Warfare Directorate (Seekriegsleitung—SKL). 
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On 10 October 1941, Hitler issued his instruction (Führerweisung) Nr. 37, which 
assigned new missions to the German armed forces in northern Norway. The 
Kriegsmarine was directed to attack enemy sea traffic to Murmansk and protect 
German traffic in the Arctic. Army High Command (Armeeoberkommando, or 
AOK) Norway, the Luftwaffe, and the Kriegsmarine were directed to cooperate 
closely during the coming months in preparing to oppose possible enemy land-
ings in front and on the sea flanks of the German forces. Hitler directed the 5th 
Air Fleet to return to Norway and establish the post of Air Leader (Fliegerführer) 
North.10
On 14 December 1941, Hitler ordered a buildup of defense installations in 
Norway and the improvement of roads in the coastal area. He believed that if 
the Western Allies were successful in capturing Norway, they would be able to 
supply the Soviet Union regularly, thereby posing a serious threat to the German 
northern front. The enemy also would be able to operate in the Baltic. Informa-
tion gathered by German agents as well as statements made by Western leaders 
and other reports in the Western press lent these views new urgency.11
In meetings with Admiral Raeder on 29 December 1941 and 12 January 1942, 
Hitler pronounced that the enemy threat to Norway required redeployment of 
heavy German ships as a deterrent against such a landing. On the basis of in-
formation from Swedish sources, he believed the British and Americans might 
land between Trondheim and Kirkenes. Hitler considered Norway to be the 
“Schicksalzone” (“Zone of Destiny”) of the entire war.12 At a meeting with Raeder 
on 22 January, Hitler stated that, from the latest information, Britian and the 
United States were planning to attack northern Norway. If successful, this would 
decisively influence the war.13 In Hitler’s view, every German heavy surface ship 
that was not in Norway was in the wrong place. Raeder fully agreed with that 
assessment.14 Hitler demanded unconditional execution of his orders aimed at 
enhancing the security of the northern area.15
The führer ordered deployment of additional air and naval forces to Norway. 
Reichsmarschal Hermann Göring (1893–1946), CINC of the Luftwaffe, was di-
rected to reinforce the Luftwaffe’s forces in Norway. And these measures had to 
be sped up, because the danger was immediate.16 Among other things, the Brest 
group (battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen) 
would be redeployed to Norway. Hitler also ordered deployment of additional S-
boats (fast-attack craft) to northern Norway and a significant increase in heavy 
artillery for defense against enemy landings.17
OPERATING AREA
During the attack on and defense of Convoy PQ17 in July 1942, the oppos-
ing naval and air forces operated in both the Norwegian and Barents Seas (see 
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map 1); however, the majority of combat actions took place in the Barents. The 
550,000-square-mile Barents Sea borders in the west on the Greenland Sea; in 
the north on the Svalbard Islands (of which the largest is Spitsbergen) and Franz 
Josef Land (Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa); in the east on Novaya Zemlya; and in the 
south on the Kola Peninsula and northern Norway. Jan Mayen and Bear Islands 
are the most important islands within the Barents Sea. The seventy-square-mile 
Bear Island (Bjørnøya) is the southernmost of the Svalbards. Its highest elevation 
is about 1,760 feet. The 34-mile-long, 144-square-mile Jan Mayen is a mountain-
ous, volcanic island partly covered by glaciers.
The weather, ice conditions, and duration of daylight in the Barents Sea and 
the adjoining littoral area greatly influenced the combat employment of surface 
ships, submarines, and aircraft. In the summer months, good visibility and low 
sea state generally prevailed.18 This facilitated air reconnaissance and shadowing. 
At the same time, long hours of daylight made it considerably more difficult for 
submarines to conduct their typical night surface attacks. Lack of cloud cover 
made it more difficult for torpedo bombers to conduct surprise attacks.19 Howev-
er, summer visibility was frequently reduced by the presence of fog: June averaged 
nine days of heavy fog, August nineteen.20 Dense fog posed a great disadvantage 
for the attacker because the target could remain concealed.21
During the winter months, gales of great violence were frequent. This often 
negatively affected fully laden eastbound convoys. Deck cargo such as tanks, wag-
ons, and locomotives endangered the safety of ships, forcing them to return to a 
port of origin. Heavy snow and ice on a ship’s upper deck and top-hamper were 
dangerous if allowed to accumulate, and once formed increased the bulk sig-
nificantly. The westbound convoys did not carry much cargo. Therefore the light 
ships ballasted their bows up so as to submerge their propellers, which sometimes 
made them unmanageable. Escorts also suffered badly; they lost boats, davits, 
and men on many occasions.22 Air reconnaissance and the use of destroyers were 
difficult because of high sea states.23
In the Greenland and Barents Seas, the pack ice affected routing of Allied 
ships bound to and from northern Russia. Generally, it was desirable to keep as 
far as possible from the German airfields in northern Norway and to evade U-
boats lurking between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. One way to do this was to 
take ships through the ice; however, the Allies soon learned that the thin hulls of 
escorts were easily damaged. Also, the ice prevented a convoy from maneuvering 
as a whole.24 In general, ice was always a danger for surface ships, even outside 
the pack—small floes could not be detected easily—so it was preferable to leave 
a margin of about forty miles from the ice boundary.25
The pack ice and icebergs were carried down the east coast of Greenland 
through the Denmark Strait. The major part of the Denmark Strait was usually 
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covered by ice. However, ice was seldom found within the hundred-fathom line, 
because the boundary between the northward-flowing, warm Irminger Current 
and the cold East Greenland Current usually overlay that line. Sometimes ice 
crossed that line and came within sight of Iceland’s coast.26 The ice situation in 
the Denmark Strait greatly affected the routing of Allied convoys to northern 
Russia. Generally, ice along Iceland’s north coast meant that Allied ships sailing 
out of Reykjavík bound northeastward were unable to pass around the west and 
north coasts from Reykjavík, instead being routed southward.27
The boundaries of the pack ice in the Barents Sea changed considerably 
over the course of a year. From December to early June, the pack ice normally 
extended close to or beyond Bear Island. For example, in March the pack’s 
southern limit was the northwestern tip of Jan Mayen Island and the west coast 
of Spitsbergen, and extending from there to Bear Island and to the Kanin Penin-
sula.28 In April, when ice conditions were the worst, with the pack ice boundary 
at its southernmost, it might be necessary to route ships nearly a hundred miles 
farther south—leaving only about 150–200 miles to the Norwegian coast.29 In 
contrast, when the pack ice boundary moved northward, it was possible to sail 
in a west-to-east direction in the area between North Cape and Spitsbergen. In 
a mild season, there was a passage of fifty miles between Bear Island and the ice 
edge, which allowed routing convoys farther north.30 Doing so allowed Allied 
ships to avoid contact with the German surface ships based in northern Norway.
Because of the ice conditions in 1942, Allied ships had to traverse the 260 nm 
distance between longitudes 20 degrees E and 35 degrees E while sailing only 
220–40 nm from the Norwegian coast. These conditions prevailed through the 
end of June.31 In March and April 1942 the ice limits were farther south than at 
any other time of the year. This forced the convoys to northern Russia to pass 
south of Bear Island, and thus within about 250 miles of the Norwegian coast.32 
After April, the sea area gradually enlarged because the ice boundary moved 
north and east. Thereafter, it was more difficult for German surface ships to at-
tack Allied convoys. In August, pack ice ran from Scoresby Strait off Greenland 
northward, then from Bell Strait (in western Spitsbergen) south of South Cape 
and Hope Island, then in a northeastern direction.33 In June 1942, the pack ice 
boundaries fell between the March and August lines.34
ALLIED OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, led by First Lord Albert 
V. Alexander. (His position was the equivalent of today’s Secretary of the Navy in 
the United States.) The Admiralty itself consisted of five sea lords plus four other 
high officials. The First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff was Admiral Pound. 
7
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He was the highest naval official responsible for naval operations. In contrast to 
the Air Ministry, the Admiralty’s responsibilities included operational planning 
and execution. The most important Admiralty divisions were Plans and Opera-
tions, Trade, and Intelligence. The work of the Plans and Operations Division was 
closely coordinated with the Intelligence Division.35
The Home Fleet was the principal operational-level command for operations 
in European waters. At the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Home Fleet 
consisted of the 2nd Battle Squadron, Battle Cruiser Squadron, aircraft carriers, 
cruisers (2nd, 7th, 12th, and 18th squadrons), Destroyer Command (6th, 7th, 
8th, and 18th Destroyer Flotillas), submarines (2nd and 6th Submarine Flotillas), 
and minesweepers (1st Minesweeping Flotilla), plus the Orkneys and Shetland 
forces. The majority of the Home Fleet’s forces were based at Scapa Flow in the 
Orkneys and Portland, England. Other bases were at Rosyth and Dundee in Scot-
land and Blyth and the Humber in England.36
During the war, the composition of the Home Fleet underwent significant 
changes because many of its heavy units were assigned to other major commands. 
The CINC of the Home Fleet after November 1940 was Admiral Tovey. On 26 
March 1942, the U.S. Navy formed Task Force (TF) 39, initially led by Rear Admi-
ral John W. Wilcox, to reinforce the Home Fleet. On 26 March, TF 39, composed 
of the battleship Washington (BB 56), carrier Wasp (CV 7), and heavy cruisers 
Wichita (CA 45) and Tuscaloosa (CA 37), plus eight destroyers, sailed from Port-
land, Maine, for Scapa Flow. One day later Admiral Wilcox was washed away and 
disappeared in a heavy sea. He was replaced by Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen.37
The Home Fleet’s geographic area of responsibility was never defined. Yet it 
clearly encompassed the northern part of the North Sea and the waters north 
of the Shetlands/Faeroes/Iceland/Greenland line. The southern part of the 
North Sea and the English Channel constituted separate commands deploying 
light forces. The squarish ocean area from the northernmost tip of Scotland 
and southwestern tip of England extending to longitude 30 degrees W was the 
responsibility of the Western Approaches Command in Liverpool (moved from 
Plymouth on 7 February 1941). On 17 February 1942, Admiral Sir Percy Noble 
was appointed CINC of Western Approaches Command. Its main responsibility 
was the protection of convoys between North American and British ports.
Initially, the main mission of the Home Fleet was to prevent German naval 
forces from breaking out of the North Sea and operating in the Atlantic. After 
the summer of 1941, its focus shifted to Norwegian waters and the Barents Sea. 
Overall responsibility for convoys to northern Russia rested with Admiral Tovey, 
CINC of the Home Fleet, but Western Approaches Command provided the ships 
necessary for the close, direct screening of convoys.
8
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CONVOYS TO NORTHERN RUSSIA
The first convoy to northern Russia (code-named DERVISH) departed from 
Hvalfjord, Iceland, on 21 August 1941—only two months after the Nazi invasion 
of the Soviet Union. This convoy consisted of only six merchant ships, and all 
reached the Soviet port of Arkhangelsk in the White Sea after a ten-day voyage.38 
On 13 September 1941, a decision was made to give a serial number to each 
convoy heading to or from northern Russia.39 The first of the eastbound PQ con-
voys (named after convoy planning officer Commander Philip Quellyn Roberts) 
left Hvalfjord on 28 September 1941.40 The first westbound convoy, QP1, left 
Arkhangelsk on 28 September and arrived at Dunnet Head, northern Scotland, 
on 11 October.41 Between 1941 and 1945, forty-two eastbound escorted convoys 
(composed of 848 ships) and thirty-six westbound escorted convoys (composed 
of 735 ships), plus one eastbound and one westbound unescorted convoy, sailed 
the Arctic route between Russia and the West.42
Ports of origins for the Allied convoys to the Soviet Union were on the U.S. east 
coast and in northern Scotland. The American ships sailed from Philadelphia 
and then joined one of the transatlantic convoys in Halifax or Sydney, Nova Sco-
tia, Canada. Afterward they sailed across the northern Atlantic to a breakaway 
point for continuing their voyage to Iceland. The British ships were organized 
into convoys at Gare Loch or Loch Ewe on the western coast of Scotland. They 
joined American-flag ships at Hvalfjord or Reykjavík, where PQ convoys were 
formed.43
Murmansk in the Kola Inlet and Arkhangelsk in the White Sea were the 
principal destination ports for Allied convoys to northern Russia. Because of the 
influence of the Gulf Stream, the Kola Inlet is ice-free year-round; Arkhangelsk 
was closed to large ships for six months out of the year because of ice.44 The port 
facilities in both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk were very primitive.45
The sea routes from Reykjavík to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are 1,500 and 
1,900 nm in length, respectively; however, the length of the convoy route to Mur-
mansk was some two thousand nautical miles because of the need to keep as far 
as possible from the Luftwaffe’s aircraft. Transit time for a convoy from Iceland to 
Murmansk was about ten days, to Arkhangelsk twelve days.46 The merchant ships 
from the United States already had a long distance to traverse merely to reach 
their assembly points in Iceland. For example, a merchant vessel sailing out of 
Philadelphia had to traverse some 645 nm to Halifax or 960 nm to Sydney. Dis-
tances from Halifax or Sydney to Reykjavík are 1,940 and 1,655 nm, respectively. 
The PQ convoy route ran generally through the Denmark Strait (which was 
mined); then as far north as ice conditions allowed, while proceeding eastward; 
then south toward the Kola Inlet or southeastward to Arkhangelsk.47
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Allied convoys to Russia generally varied in size between fifteen and thirty 
ships, although some were larger. Smaller convoys ran until early 1942, when 
a decision was made to increase the size of convoys bound to Russia.48 On 26 
February 1942, Admiral Tovey requested that westbound and eastbound convoys 
sail simultaneously so that their transits through the most dangerous areas could 
be synchronized. This would entail fourteen-day cycles for convoys to and from 
Russia.49 A decision was made that a pair of convoys would sail starting in early 
March 1942, and the practice became standard thereafter.50 In May, Admiral 
Tovey advocated reducing the number of convoys during the coming months 
because improved weather conditions would greatly facilitate operations of the 
enemy’s reconnaissance aircraft and bombers, and because the ice boundary 
would not have receded northward sufficiently to avoid these attacks.51 However, 
the Admiralty rejected his recommendation.
The Allied convoys were potentially subject to attack by enemy surface ships 
and U-boats along the entire route, and for some 1,400 miles by aircraft.52 Both 
ends of the convoy route were within range of the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance 
aircraft. In contrast, the British reconnaissance seaplanes operated from a single 
base, Sullom Voe in the Shetland Islands. The Germans believed that these planes 
were also based on the Langanes Peninsula, Iceland (see map 2). The maneuver-
ing area for a convoy and its covering forces was limited northward and westward 
by ice and southward by the enemy-occupied coast. Within that convoying area 
the currents were uncertain, and frequent gales could disperse a convoy, driving 
ships many miles from their intended route.53
Initially, the Allied convoys to northern Russia were weakly defended from 
attacks by German aircraft and U-boats. This highly unfavorable situation began 
to change for the better in the spring of 1942. In late April, additional destroyers, 
corvettes, and trawlers were transferred from Western Approaches Command 
to the Home Fleet, bringing the number of antisubmarine (A/S) escorts for each 
convoy to about ten.54 However, the Allies’ continuing shortage of destroyers 
combined with the difficulty in refueling them limited their ability to hunt U-
boats at any significant distance from a convoy.55 Each convoy was accompanied 
by at least one fleet oiler for refueling the short-legged destroyers and corvettes.
Each eastbound convoy was accompanied by two submarines to discourage 
enemy surface attack. Several British and the Soviet submarines patrolled the 
areas northwest and west off North Cape.56
The Allies tried repeatedly to involve the Soviet Northern Fleet further in 
protecting convoys. Admiral Tovey in his messages to the Admiralty “pressed for 
strong and continuous Russian patrol activity off the Kola Inlet, to make that area 
untenable by U-boats, and for short-range and long-range fighter protection.”57 
10
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Tovey believed that this provision of fighter cover—both long-range (two hun-
dred miles off the Kola Inlet) and short-range (sixty miles off), during the most 
dangerous part of the voyage—was both crucial and within Soviet capabilities. 
The Soviet Northern Fleet had sufficient destroyers and smaller A/S ships to op-
erate farther from its bases than heretofore, and Tovey felt the Soviets should take 
over responsibility for defense of the convoys during the White Sea segment of 
the passage. Also, the Soviet submarines based in Polyarny, Kola Peninsula, could 
be employed for scouting and intercepting the German heavy surface ships.58
The British requested that the Russians not only reinforce escorts at the east-
ern end of the voyage by providing long-range fighters or A/S air escort but also 
bomb enemy airfields during convoy transits to discourage surface attacks east 
of Bear Island.59 Although the Soviets repeatedly promised that they would pro-
vide adequate protection to the Allied convoys, they seldom did so in practice.60 
Formally, the Soviets took responsibility for protecting Allied convoys once they 
crossed longitude 18 degrees E.61 They also conducted intensive reconnaissance 
of the German naval and air bases in northern Norway. The submarines of the 
Soviet Northern Fleet patrolled off the Norwegian coast, covering the possible 
deployment routes of German surface forces.62 However, the fact was that the 
Soviets were unable to provide adequate protection to the Allied convoys during 
the most dangerous phase of the transit.63
GERMAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
The German operational command organization in the northern theater was 
highly fragmented. The Germans never established a true multiservice or joint 
command in this theater; instead, each service controlled its own forces. Coop-
eration was supposed to be secured through the posting of liaison officers at the 
main headquarters of each of the three services. The highest command echelon 
controlling army troops in Norway and Finland was High Army Command 
Norway, led by General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, from Command Post Finland 
in Rovaniemi, Finland. It was created from Group XXI in December 1941 and 
disbanded in December 1944. Army Norway was directly subordinate to the 
High Command of the (German) Army (Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH).
Kriegsmarine CINC Admiral Raeder and Luftwaffe CINC Reichsmarschal 
Göring had operational command over all their respective forces. Raeder headed 
the High Command of the Navy (Oberkommando der Marine—OKM) (estab-
lished 11 January 1936). The Naval Warfare Directorate, formed on 1 April 1937, 
had responsibility for the conduct of naval warfare as a whole. The Operations 
Directorate (1./SKL) was the most important of the six SKL staff directorates in 
1942. The OKM also had a permanent representative at Hitler’s headquarters (see 
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figure 1). Contact with the Luftwaffe was maintained through a liaison officer to 
the Luftwaffe CINC.64
By the end of 1941, the highest operational-level headquarters of the Kriegs-
marine were Fleet Command (Flottenkommando) and four naval group com-
mands (Marinegruppenkommandos—MGKs): North, East, West, and South. 
Other major commands were Naval Station Baltic (Marinestation Ostsee), Naval 
Station North Sea (Marinestation Nordsee), and German Naval Command Italy 
(Deutsches Marinekommando Italien). Naval Group Command North (MGK 
Nord) was led (21 September 1940–2 March 1943) by General Admiral Rolf Carls 
(1885–1945). On 10 August 1940 it had been renamed from Naval Group Com-
mand East (MGK Ost) and moved from Kiel to Sengwarden, near Wilhelmsha-
ven.65 At the same time, Naval Group Command West (MGK West) was moved 
from Sengwarden to Paris.66 Naval Group Command North was responsible for 
all Kriegsmarine activities in the German Bight, the northern part of the North 
Sea, the northern Atlantic Ocean (north of Scotland), and the Arctic.67
In 1942, the major part of German fleet forces was deployed in northern Nor-
way. The fleet commander (June 1941–July 1944) was Admiral Otto Schniewind, 
flying his flag in Tirpitz. Directly subordinate to the fleet commander were the 
positions of commander of battleships (Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe—B.d.S.) 
(June 1941–May 1942) and the respective leaders of destroyers (Führer der 
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder
CINC of the Kriegsmarine
Naval High Command 
(Berlin)
General Admiral Rolf Carls
Naval Group Command North 
(Sengwarden)















* Dissolved 2 June 1942
** Established 3 June 1942
Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax
Commander of Battleships*
Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz
Commander of Cruisers **
Commander of Destroyers Commander of S-boats
FIGURE 1
GERMAN NAVAL ORGANIZATION IN NORWAY, JUNE 1942
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Zerstörer) (August 1940–May 1945), T(orpedo)-boats (Führer der Torpedo-
boote) (August 1940–April 1942), and U-boats (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote) 
(November 1939–July 1942). The post of leader of the U-boats (Führer der U-
Boote) had been renamed commander of U-boats (Befehlshaber der U-Boote) 
on 17 October 1939; the latter German term signified a command’s enhanced im-
portance. In the operational chain of command, Commander of U-boats Admiral 
Karl Dönitz became directly subordinate to the OKM; administratively, U-boats 
remained subordinate to the fleet command.68 The commander of battleships 
was renamed commander of the cruisers (Befehlshaber der Kreuzer, or B.d.K.) 
in June 1942, and the leader of the torpedo boats became leader of the S-boats 
(Führer der Schnellboote) in April 1942.
Directly subordinate to Naval Group Command North was the Command-
ing Admiral Norway (Kommandierende Admiral Norwegen), led by General 
Admiral Hermann Boehm. The entire Norwegian coast was divided into three 
geographically based commands: Admiral Norwegian Polar Coast (Tromsö), Ad-
miral Norwegian Northern Coast (Trondheim), and Admiral Norwegian West-
ern Coast (Bergen), plus Commandant of Naval Defenses Oslofjord (Horten). 
In accordance with Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 37, the operational staff of Admiral 
Arctic was established on 16 October 1941, at which point Admiral Polar Coast 
became subordinate to Admiral Arctic.69 Admiral Hubert Schmundt, with head-
quarters in Kirkenes, was the first Admiral Arctic (October 1941–August 1942). 
He, in turn, was subordinate to Commanding Admiral Norway. However, at the 
beginning of 1942 Commanding Admiral Norway proposed that Admiral Arctic 
should be directly subordinate to Naval Group Command North. The aim was to 
unify conduct of the naval war in Arctic waters. Another reason for this change 
in command relationships was that Commanding Admiral Norway lacked the 
technical means to conduct communications.70
After April 1942, Commanding Admiral Norway became responsible for the 
security of sea traffic around North Cape to the frontline forces in Finland, and 
for supplying Mountain Corps Norway in Finnmark.71 Admiral Arctic was also 
directed to attack enemy maritime traffic, protect German coastal shipping, and 
conduct defensive mining of coastal waters and ports. A special naval command-
er was to be appointed to accomplish these tasks.72 However, in practice it was 
Admiral Carls who controlled all operations in the Arctic—Admiral Schmundt 
essentially only transmitted his orders to subordinate commanders.73
On 18 June 1942, the SKL directed that Admiral Arctic be responsible for the 
conduct of U-boat warfare against enemy traffic and escorts in the area east of 
the Denmark Strait and Jan Mayen Island. The weight of the main effort (Schwer­
punkt) was to be the employment of U-boats against PQ convoys; however, 
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should an Allied landing occur, the main effort would shift to enemy transports 
and escorts.74
After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the 5th Air Fleet (Luft-
flotte 5), led by General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1889–1968), was the highest 
Luftwaffe command echelon in Norway and Finland. Until the end of 1941, the 
Air Leader North (West) in Stavanger was the principal subordinate commander 
of the 5th Air Fleet (see map 2). His forces were based in the area of Stavanger 
and Trondheim.75 In Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 37 of October 1941, the führer di-
rected that a major part of the 5th Air Fleet be transferred from Finland back 
to Norway. Headquarters were moved to Oslo, while an operational command 
post was established at Kemi, near Kirkenes. The Air Leader North (West) was in 
Forus/Stavanger, Air Leader Lofoten in Bardufoss, and Air Leader North (East) 
in Kirkenes (see figure 2).76 After June 1941, all fighter aircraft were subordinate 
to the Fighter Air Leader, Norway (Jagdfliegerführer Norwegen), with his staff at 
Forus, near Stavanger. The Air District Command, Norway (Luftgau-Kommando 
Norwegen) in Oslo had responsibility for all air bases and ground-based Luft-
waffe units and installations.
The 5th Air Fleet’s operational area (Operationsgebiet) encompassed the 
Skagerrak (between Norway and Denmark); the northern part of the North 
Sea and northern Scotland; the northern Atlantic; the Arctic Ocean; and the 
General Hans-Jürgen Stump














Air District Command, Finland
Air District Command, Norway
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Murmansk front.77 Its main missions were defending against any enemy amphibi-
ous landing; reconnoitering coastal waters; and attacking Arctic convoys, in co-
operation with the Kriegsmarine.78 Specifically, the 5th Air Fleet was responsible 
for cooperating with naval forces, providing security for German sea supplies, 
conducting offensive mining, and defending against enemy raids. In cooperating 
with the U-boats, the Luftwaffe’s main tasks were to provide reconnaissance of 
the operating area of the U-boats engaging enemy convoys; combat any enemy 
fighter aircraft posing a threat to the U-boats; and conduct joint attacks with the 
U-boats on the PQ convoys. In cooperating with naval surface forces, the Luft-
waffe’s main missions were reconnoitering the operating area and attacking sea 
targets within the framework of an operation.79
In practice, cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine in the 
northern area was unsatisfactory. The major reason was that both practiced rath-
er rigid, centralized command and control. For example, if Admiral Arctic had a 
need for air reconnaissance, he had to send a request to Naval Group Command 
North in Sengwarden; from there the request was transmitted to the 5th Air Fleet 
in Oslo/Kemi. This resulted in a long delay in obtaining permission. If granted, 
the latter headquarters then gave orders to the respective air commanders.80 
Other factors that made radio communications difficult were a lack of interop-
erability (the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe used different radio transmitters) 
and the difficult, mountainous terrain of Norway. All radio communications ran 
via Naval Group Command North in Sengwarden; employment of the Luftwaffe 
was directed from Oslo; but radio communications between Oslo and Sengwar-
den were inadequate.81 Combined with the unsatisfactory technical aspect of 
communications, this made it very difficult to organize cooperation between the 
Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. After Raeder complained about the problem, 
Hitler issued orders to reinforce Luftwaffe units in Norway and to improve coop-
eration with the Kriegsmarine. The leaders of the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine 
discussed the problem, and decided to exchange liaison officers between the 5th 
Air Fleet and Admiral Arctic.82
ALLIED VS. GERMAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
For both the Allies and the Germans, accurate and timely intelligence about the 
enemy’s order of battle (OOB), plans, intentions, and movements was essential to 
a successful outcome of the war in Arctic waters. The British Admiralty’s Naval 
Intelligence Division (NID) was responsible for preparing at least daily, and often 
hourly, reports regarding enemy forces anywhere in the world. The Operational 
Intelligence Centre (OIC), created in February 1939, was the most important 
of NID’s eight sections. It was headed by a navy captain.83 As part of the Joint 
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Intelligence Committee, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) worked closely 
with his counterparts in the War Office and the Air Ministry.84
The British relied on several sources of intelligence to deduce enemy inten-
tions, plans, and movements. These included direction finding, photographic 
reconnaissance, captured enemy documents, prisoners of war, and signals intel-
ligence, the last being the most important. The main source of decrypted enemy 
messages was the cryptanalysts at the Government Code and Cypher School at 
Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, England.85
Normally, German ships did not use radio communications while at anchor in 
Trondheim; however, they did use radio transmissions between ships anchored 
at Vestfjord and Altafjord. And shore commands communicated by radio with 
the heavy ships when they were at sea—sending a steady stream of messages, in 
fact. So the absence of such signals was a good indicator that the ships were still 
in port or in some other fjord.86
Air reconnaissance of the German naval bases/anchorages and airfields 
in northern Norway was extremely difficult because of the long distances in-
volved and the often-appalling weather. The British deployed submarines in the 
area between North Cape and Bear Island. The Allies’ network of Norwegian 
agents, which would prove so valuable later in the war, had not yet been fully 
established.87 However, the British were lucky in having some excellent Swedish 
sources of information on German forces in Norway. The British naval attaché in 
Stockholm, Captain Henry Denham, established good relations with the Swed-
ish secret service, especially Major Törnberg (assistant to Major Carl Petersén, 
head of C-Bureau, a unit for secret intelligence collection). The Swedes had a 
good source of intelligence because the Germans’ telegraph and teleprinter lines 
to their naval, army, and Luftwaffe forces in Norway passed through Swedish 
territory. The Swedes were successful in tapping those lines and in breaking a 
number of German ciphers. Denham was often provided with the results of the 
Swedish cryptanalysts’ work. To avoid suspicion being cast on the Swedish secret 
service, Denham met his contacts in a park or some other public place. All the 
information passed over had to be memorized until Denham could get back to 
his embassy and send a signal to the DNI in London. Among other things, these 
Swedish sources gave the first positive clue about the movements of the battleship 
Bismarck in May 1941.88
For the British, the single most critical factor in their ultimate success in the 
Battle of the Atlantic was their ability to read the German navy’s radio messages. 
Yet while many of these messages were read, not all were; and the codes were 
generally difficult to crack.89 But the British did break the German naval cipher 
HYDRA, which was used by not only the patrol vessels and minesweepers but 
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also the U-boats based in Norway, as well as the heavy ships. (The exception was 
special operations, when the NEPTUNE cipher was used; the British code breakers 
at Bletchley Park partially penetrated it.) Major changes in the German cipher 
settings occurred every forty-eight hours, and minor ones every twenty-four 
hours. Bletchley Park largely mastered the daily changes of cipher settings; it was 
the major changes that caused a problem. Once a major code change was broken, 
the lesser ones were usually cracked quickly.90 However, delays did occur, leaving 
gaps varying in length from four to forty-eight hours.91 Hence, there were cases 
when the British were blind or not current at a critical moment. With regard to 
messages sent by landlines, the British were unable to learn anything about them 
unless they received the information from Stockholm. They were also unaware 
of German written instructions. In short, even the best intelligence sources could 
not be relied on to give a complete and continuous picture of what was happening, 
let alone what was going to happen, on the other side of the North Sea.92
Further, on 1 February 1942, the Germans directed all U-boat cipher operators 
to abandon the use of HYDRA codes to tighten security. They introduced a new 
version of the Enigma coding machine, the Triton M4, that used four instead of 
three rotors. Codes generated by the Triton M4 (called SHARK by the British) 
were unreadable using then-existing methods of decoding.93 It was not until late 
1942 that Bletchley Park decoders were able to read these messages.94
The primary source of intelligence for the Kriegsmarine was the Naval Intel-
ligence Service (Marinenachrichtendienst—MND). It was established in June 
1941; the Naval Intelligence Inspectorate (Marinenachrichten Inspektion) was 
dissolved.95 The Naval Communications Service (Amtsgruppe Marinenachrich-
tendienst—4./SKL) was one of MND’s most important office groups. Its Division 
of Radio Intelligence (Funkaufklärung) (4./SKL/III), or B-Dienst (Beobachtung-
Dienst—Observation Service), was primarily responsible for monitoring, deci-
phering, and evaluating enemy radio communications.96 B-Dienst was highly 
regarded by the rest of the Kriegsmarine for its professionalism and the high 
quality of its analysis. Admiral Raeder highly praised its work.97 B-Dienst and 
German Military Intelligence (the Abwehr) had a loose administrative relation-
ship because two of the Abwehr’s departments dealt with “naval matters” (Group 
IV: Radio Intelligence and Group V: Naval Espionage).98
B-Dienst played a pivotal role in the first part of the Battle of the Atlantic.99 
Generally, B-Dienst had a reasonably clear and current picture of the convoy 
situation. It provided essential information to U-boats for their attacks on Allied 
convoys.100 It achieved a great success in March 1942 when it cracked the Allied 
convoy code. This enabled Dönitz to receive decoded signals within twenty-four 
hours of their transmission. From June through November 1942, almost all or-
ders to U-boats were based on German knowledge of decoded signals.101
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The Germans had relatively good knowledge of the Allies’ naval OOB in 
northern Scotland and Iceland. Most of the information came from radio inter-
cepts obtained by B-Dienst, photographic reconnaissance by Luftwaffe aircraft, 
and reports from U-boats.
Initially, the Germans did not have precise information on Allied efforts to sup-
ply the Soviet Union via the Arctic route. Yet already in September 1941, the Ger-
man Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the OKM noticed the increased 
importance of the convoys to northern Russia. They believed at first that supplies 
brought in by these convoys were solely intended for the support of Soviet forces 
fighting on the Murmansk front. They also thought that the Soviets, with the help 
of the British and Canadians, would try to capture vitally important nickel mines 
at Petsamo. This estimate of the situation was expressed in Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 
36 for winter operations in Norway, issued on 22 September 1941.102
However, air reconnaissance and information obtained from agents indicated 
that the enemy convoys were bringing in supplies to be used on the entire east-
ern front. The Germans also deduced that Murmansk and Arkhangelsk were the 
principal destination ports for the enemy convoys. German radio intercepts re-
vealed that the enemy used convoys with a P-Q designation for northern Russian 
convoys; eastbound convoys were designated PQ, westbound QP. The Germans 
knew that the enemy had sent seven eastbound convoys (PQ1–PQ7) by the end 
of 1941. However, because of bad weather conditions in the Arctic, the Germans 
never learned the positions of or the nature of the screens for those convoys.103
By mid-January 1942, the SKL had a clearer picture of the operational situa-
tion. It learned that the convoys originated in Scottish ports. Yet it erroneously 
believed that partial convoys from the United States stopped at Seydisfjord, Ice-
land, and from there sailed three to four times per month to northern Russia (see 
map 3). The screen was composed of cruisers and destroyers, with sometimes a 
single aircraft carrier.104
In mid-February 1942, the Germans learned that the route for the PQ convoys 
ran from Iceland to the southern tip of Bear Island, then eastward to longitude 
38°40ʹ E, then southward to latitude 70 degrees N, where the routes to Murmansk 
and Arkhangelsk separated. The return QP convoys left at the same time as the 
PQ convoys heading to the north Russian ports. The QPs were routed eastward 
and southward of the PQ route. Intervals between successive convoy pairs were 
about fifteen days.105
ALLIED PLANS
Allied planning for Convoys PQ17 and QP13 followed a well-established pat-
tern. While the Admiralty and the Home Fleet were gravely concerned about 
the safety of convoys to northern Russia during the summer months, they had 
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no choice but to send them; political reasons—support of the embattled Soviet 
Union—trumped purely military considerations.106 The time of sailing of the 
convoys could not be concealed from the Germans for more than a day or two 
at most. Hence, it was clear to Admirals Pound and Tovey that sooner or later a 
major disaster was bound to occur. This would be so especially if convoys con-
tinued to run in the summer months, when perpetual daylight prevailed. Pound 
believed firmly that another sortie by Tirpitz (the first foray, against convoys 
PQ12 and QP8 on 13 March 1942, had failed) was inevitable. He argued strongly 
to the War Cabinet that convoys should be postponed until at least the following 
winter. However, he was overruled because of strong pressure from Churchill and 
Roosevelt. Preparations for Convoy PQ17 went ahead.107
Admiral Tovey received information in June 1942 that the enemy intended to 
bring out his main force to attack an eastbound convoy. This meant that enemy 
surface ships would be operating in the area between Norway and Spitsbergen—
where British ships would be operating about a thousand miles from friendly air 
bases. The British destroyers also would be too short on fuel to escort any dam-
aged ships.108 The only hope, Tovey argued, was to induce the Germans to use 
their heavy ships toward the west. This would mean that an eastbound convoy, 
after reaching longitude 10 degrees E, would temporarily delay its transit for 
twelve to eighteen hours (unless it was known that the German heavy ships were 
still in port, or that the weather prevented shadowing by enemy aircraft). Tovey 
hoped that this temporary withdrawal would tempt the German heavy ships to 
pursue, cause them to return to port, or force them to sail into the operating area 
of the British and Russian submarines.109
The Admiralty rejected Tovey’s proposal. Yet the Admiralty’s instructions 
issued on 27 June envisaged the possibility, under certain circumstances, of 
the convoy being temporarily turned back, on Admiralty orders.110 The same 
document stated that the safety of the convoy against surface attack west of Bear 
Island “must be met by our surface forces, and to the eastward of that meridian 
[10 degrees E] must be met by submarines; and that the cruiser covering force 
was not intended to go east of Bear Island, unless the convoy was threatened by 
the presence of a surface force which the cruisers could fight, or in any case to 
go beyond 25° E.”111
Convoy PQ17 consisted of thirty-six merchant ships (twenty-three of them 
American), plus three rescue ships that technically were not part of the convoy. 
Commodore John C. K. Dowding commanded the convoy.112 The convoy carried 
156,492 tons of weapons, equipment, and other supplies. Among weapons and 
equipment, 594 tanks, 4,246 motor vehicles, and 297 aircraft were on board.113 
The plan envisaged that three oilers (designated Force Q) would accompany the 
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convoy to refuel both the destroyers accompanying Convoys PQ17 and QP13 and 
those with the Cruiser Covering Force.114
The route for Convoy PQ17 ran from Hvalfjord around the western and 
northern coasts of Iceland; through the Denmark Strait; past the east coast of Jan 
Mayen; northeast to the vicinity of latitude 75 degrees N, longitude 19 degrees E; 
from there due east, passing north of Bear Island; then proceeding southeast.115 
Upon crossing the longitude of the Kola Inlet (approximately 33 degrees E), the 
convoy route south would split, with one track leading into Murmansk and an-
other on to Arkhangelsk.116 This route ran more to the north than usual because 
the ice boundary had moved farther away from Bear Island. This increased the 
distance from the enemy air bases in northern Norway.117 It also made Convoy 
PQ17’s route longer than usual.118
Defenses for the PQ17/QP13 convoys were similar to those for the PQ16/
QP12 convoys. They consisted of a direct A/S screen and a “long-range escort 
force” sailing with the convoy, a Cruiser Covering Force for close cover, and a 
Battle Fleet for distant cover and support. The direct A/S screen and the long-
range escort force for Convoy PQ17 were under Commander John E. Broome, 
RN. The direct A/S screen consisted of four corvettes, two auxiliary antiaircraft 
(AA) ships, four minesweepers, and four armed trawlers. The long-range escort 
consisted of six destroyers and two submarines (see sidebar, “Allied Order of 
Battle”).119
The Cruiser Covering Force was designated Cruiser Squadron 1 (CS 1). It 
consisted of two British (London, Norfolk) and two U.S. cruisers (Tuscaloosa, 
Wichita) under Rear Admiral Louis K. Hamilton, plus one British (Somali) and 
two U.S. destroyers (Wainwright, Rowan). CS 1, in turn, was organized into three 
divisions: 1st Division (London, Norfolk), 2nd Division (Tuscaloosa, Wichita), and 
3rd Division (Somali, Wainwright, Rowan).120 This force would provide cover as 
far as Bear Island.121 The Battle Fleet, under Admiral Tovey, was composed of the 
British battleship Duke of York, the U.S. battleship Washington, the British carrier 
Victorious, the British cruisers Cumberland and Nigeria, and twelve destroyers.122
Tovey’s plan was for the Battle Fleet to reach latitude 65°56ʹ N and longitude 
10°30ʹ E at 0730 on 1 July. After four destroyers from Seydisfjord joined the force, 
the remaining fleet destroyers would be detached to Seydisfjord and the Battle 
Force would proceed to provide distant cover for Convoy PQ17. CINC Rosyth 
(Scotland) was asked to arrange A/S escort and long-range fighter escort for the 
Battle Force as far northward as possible.123
Initially, eight British and one Free French submarines were assigned to and 
deployed in patrolling areas between North Cape and Bear Island.124 British 
Continued on page 106
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ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE
CONVOY PQ17
(Commodore John C. K. Dowding)
Total: 39 Ships
36 merchant ships (23 U.S., 8 U.K., 2 Soviet, 2 Panamanian, 1 Dutch); 3 
rescue ships (U.K.)
MERCHANT SHIPS




Bolton Castle (U.K.) (sunk)
Carlton (U.S.) (sunk)
Christopher Newport (U.S.) (sunk)
Daniel Morgan (U.S.) (sunk)
Donbass (Soviet)
Earlston (U.K.) (sunk)
El Capitan (Panamanian) (sunk)
Empire Byron (U.K.) (sunk)
Empire Tide (U.K.)
Exford (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)
Fairfield City (U.S.) (sunk)
Hartlebury (U.K.) (sunk)
Honomu (U.S.) (sunk)
Hoosier (U.S.) (sunk)  
Ironclad (U.S.)
John Witherspoon (U.S.) (sunk)
Navarino (U.K.) (sunk) 
Ocean Freedom (U.K.)
Olopana (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Atlantic (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Kraft (U.S.) (sunk)
Paulus Potter (Dutch) (sunk)
Peter Kerr (U.S.) (sunk)
Richard Bland (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)













(Commander John E. Broome, RN, in Keppel)
LONG-RANGE ESCORTS
6 destroyers: Fury, Keppel, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa, Wilton
2 submarines: P614, P615
A/S SCREEN
4 corvettes: Dianella, Lotus, Poppy; La Malouine (Free French)
4 A/S trawlers: Ayrshire, Lord Austin, Lord Middleton, Northern Gem
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submarines operating north of latitude 51 degrees N were informed that the 
main German units might operate from near the longitude of Bear Island to the 
southward of their patrol lines prior to attacking the PQ and QP convoys. Ice 
conditions might force the convoy to pass south of Bear Island. Hence, it was of 
utmost importance for the submarines to maintain accurate positions, particu-
larly with regard to their latitude.125 Five Soviet submarines patrolled the area 
north of Ingøy Island.126
Admiral Hamilton, in his operation order issued 25 June 1942, assumed that 
the Germans would be sufficiently tempted by PQ17 and QP13 to send their 
heavy ships to sea. After all, two enemy pocket battleships and some destroyers 
had been moved to more northerly ports in Norway, and more aircraft had been 
2 auxiliary AA vessels: Palomares, Pozarica
4 minesweepers: Bramble, Britomart, Leda, Salamander
SUPPLY GROUP—FORCE Q
2 fleet oilers: Grey Ranger (damaged by ice on 28 June; replaced by Alders-
dale), Aldersdale (sunk)
1 fleet oiler: Gray (for QP13)
1 destroyer: Douglas
CRUISER COVERING FORCE—CRUISER SQUADRON 1 (CS 1)
(Rear Admiral Louis K. Hamilton, RN, in London)
4 heavy cruisers 
2 British: London, Norfolk 
2 U.S.: Tuscaloosa (CA 37), Wichita (CA 45)
3 destroyers 
1 British: Somali 
2 U.S.: Rowan (DD 405), Wainwright (DD 419)
BATTLE FLEET
(Admiral Sir John Tovey, CINC Home Fleet, in Duke of York)
2 battleships 
1 British: Duke of York 
1 U.S.: Washington (BB 56) (Rear Admiral R. C. Giffen—TF 39)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (Vice Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser)
1 heavy cruiser: Cumberland
1 light cruiser: Nigeria
12 destroyers 
10 British: Ashanti, Blankney, Escapade, Faulknor, Marne, Martin, 
Middleton, Onslaught, Onslow, Wheatland  
2 U.S.: Mayrant (DD 402), Rhind (DD 404)
SUBMARINES
8 British: Sahib (P212), Sea Wolf (47S), Sturgeon (73S), Tribune (N76),  
Trident, Unrivalled (P45), Unshaken (P54), Ursula (N59)
1 Free French: Minerve
5 Soviet
Sources: Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57; Dowding, “Report 
of Convoy from Iceland to Time of ‘Scatter,’ 4th July”; Commanding Officer to the Chief 
of Naval Operations, “War Diary U.S.S. Washington, for Period from July 1, 1942, to July 
31, 1942,” folder BB 56 Washington War Diary—with Home Fleet, box 1554, Wasatch 
to Washington, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records 
Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA; Harriman (NAVCOM LONDON) to 
OPNAV, 2148/29TM (29 June 1942). 
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sent north as well. Hamilton assumed that the enemy units most likely to be 
encountered would be Tirpitz, Lützow, Admiral Hipper, and Admiral Scheer, plus 
some ten destroyers. Because of respective speeds, the most likely combinations 
would be Tirpitz with Admiral Hipper and Lützow with Admiral Scheer.127
In Hamilton’s words, CS 1’s primary objective was to get PQ17 to Russia. A 
slightly less important objective was to bring the enemy heavy ships into action 
with the Battle Fleet and Cruiser Covering Force. To increase the chances of the 
latter action occurring, PQ17 would probably be turned back after reaching the 
approximate longitude of 10 degrees E, and then turned eastward again. The hope 
was to lure the German ships farther from their bases or keep them longer at sea 
within Allied submarine zones.128
The Battle Fleet would begin covering an area in the vicinity of latitude 71 de-
grees N, longitude 0 degrees E by the afternoon of the sixth day (D+6) and remain 
until D+8, not proceeding north of latitude 72°30ʹ N.129 The Cruiser Covering 
Force would leave Seydisfjord on the morning of D+5 to reach its covering area 
at latitude 73 degrees N, longitude 4 degrees E at about noon on D+6. It would 
remain in the area until D+8, or longer if circumstances dictated. Hamilton’s 
intent was to avoid being drawn within close range of the enemy’s shore-based 
aircraft or submarine concentration.130
In support of the operation, Allied planners envisaged the use of a dummy 
convoy (Operation E.S.) aimed at deceiving the Germans into believing that an 
attack on Norway was imminent. Hence, a group of five ships of the 1st Mining 
Squadron plus four colliers escorted by two cruisers (Sirius, Curacao), five de-
stroyers, and some trawlers would sail out of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys.131 This 
group would sortie several days prior to the departure of Convoy PQ17. It would 
pass west of the Shetlands and steer as far as latitude 61°30ʹ N and longitude 1 
degree E, hoping to be seen and reported by enemy aircraft before it turned back 
toward Scapa Flow. In addition, this plan envisaged bombing targets in southern 
Norway, thereby reinforcing the perception that the dummy convoy was heading 
there.132
In June 1942, arrangements were made with the Soviets to deploy a few PBY-2 
Catalina aircraft (No. 210 Squadron) to Arkhangelsk for reconnoitering the sea 
area between Altafjord and Convoy PQ17 on 1–3 July as the ships moved east-
ward; but the resulting patrol encountered nothing remarkable.133
Rear Admiral Geoffrey J. A. Miles, head of the British military mission to 
Moscow, informed the Admiralty on 16 June that the people’s commissar (min-
ister) of the navy, Admiral Nikolay Kuznetsov, promised that all Soviet resources 
would be concentrated on convoy protection. Kuznetsov had not been satisfied 
with the Soviet air effort for Convoy PQ16, but was optimistic about better results 
in the future. He promised to talk to the Defense Committee again to get more 
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long-range fighters. In addition, in the future, some bombers, instead of being 
used to bomb aerodromes, might be used to help long-range fighters. As many 
long-range Hurricane fighters as possible would be sent to the air base at Ponoy 
before Convoy PQ17’s arrival.134
GERMAN PLANS
German plans for the employment of heavy surface ships against a PQ convoy 
were based on several “appreciations” (staff studies) prepared by various naval 
commands during the winter and spring of 1941–42. As was the custom in the 
Kriegsmarine (and in the German Wehrmacht in general), the highest command 
echelon, Naval Group Command North, issued an “operational instruction” (op­
erative Weisung), while the subordinate commanders issued “operation orders” 
(Operationbefehle). The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe prepared their separate 
operational plans for the attack on Convoy PQ17. However, each plan envisaged 
close cooperation with the other service.
On 4 June 1942, Admiral Carls issued his operational instruction for employ-
ing the Trondheim and Narvik groups (designated the 1st and 2nd Combat 
Groups, respectively) against the next enemy PQ convoy. The picture, as the 
instruction anticipated it, was as follows. Because the Allies ran the PQ/QP con-
voys at fourteen-to-fifteen-day intervals, the next convoy was expected in the Jan 
Mayen area on 20 June. Generally, the PQ convoys sailed in column formation, 
with four to five merchant ships in each column. The screen usually consisted 
of one cruiser in the midsection and three to four destroyers some 5,500 yards 
ahead of the convoy. Individual destroyers and any other escorts secured the con-
voy’s flanks. The previous enemy convoy had sailed close to the flock ice bound-
ary. A heavy security group that included a carrier had been positioned eastward 
of the Jan Mayen–Faeroes area.135
The operational instruction of 4 June established two chains of command, 
one for the first phase (deployment of the combat groups to their “jumping-off ” 
positions) and another for the second phase (deployment from the jumping-off 
positions to the attacking positions). In the first phase, Naval Group Command 
North at Sengwarden would exercise operational control of the Trondheim 
group, while the fleet commander in Tirpitz would exercise tactical control. For 
the Narvik group, operational control would be in the hands of Admiral Arctic on 
board the S-boat mother ship Tanga, while tactical command and control would 
be exercised by the commander of cruisers in Lützow.136 In the second phase of 
the operation, overall operational control over both surface forces and U-boats 
would be in the hands of Commander, Naval Group Command North. Admiral 
Arctic would retain operational control of the S-boats in the Kola Peninsula area. 
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After the forces were assembled, tactical command and control would rest in the 
hands of the fleet commander. The headquarters of Admiral Arctic would serve 
as radio repeater for the U-boats. Direct control of the U-boats by the fleet com-
mander was not envisaged.137
The operational instruction of 4 June specified the composition of the Trond-
heim and Narvik combat groups for the pending operation. The Trondheim 
group would consist of Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper, two destroyers, and three tor-
pedo boats. The Narvik group would consist of Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and six 
destroyers. Besides the Trondheim and Narvik combat groups, Admiral Carls 
envisaged employing three U-boats northeast of Jan Mayen by 10 June. Their 
mission was to obtain early contact with the next PQ convoy and its heavy cover-
ing forces. Additional U-boat groups would be deployed in the area between Jan 
Mayen and Bear Islands.138
Operationally, RÖSSELSPRUNG was simple in concept but difficult in execution. 
Almost everything depended on a timely and covert joining of the two combat 
groups, followed by their unobserved movement toward the anticipated position 
of Convoy PQ17 (see map 3). Specifically, the Trondheim group would move 
to its jumping-off position of Gimsøystraumen in Vestfjord; at the same time, 
the Narvik group, directed by Commanding Admiral Arctic, would move to its 
jumping-off position at the northern exit of Altafjord, in the skerries (rocky islets) 
of Sørøya. Both groups were to be ready to sortie within twenty-four hours after 
leaving their bases for their jumping-off positions. Destroyers and torpedo boats 
would be fully refueled. After the joining of the two combat groups, the torpedo 
boats would be refueled at Altafjord and remain there in a three-hour ready-
for-sortie status. The destroyers’ short radius of action imposed limits on their 
speed during the operation.139 The danger of torpedoes was posed by not only the 
enemy surface forces and aircraft but also submarines; the latter had been used 
to screen the previous PQ convoy. On a signal from Commander, Naval Group 
Command North, both groups would sortie from their respective jumping- 
off positions so as to arrive at a meeting point determined by Commander, Naval 
Group Command North.140 Breaking off the action, if necessary, either would be 
ordered by Commander, Naval Group Command North or would result from an 
independent decision of the fleet commander.141
The situation would require massing German forces rapidly and keeping the 
duration of the operation short. The primary mission was the quick destruction 
of the enemy’s merchant ships. However, the heavy surface ships could merely 
neutralize the enemy cargo ships; their actual sinking should be left to the U-
boats and Luftwaffe. Among the enemy ships, sinking the tankers would be 
especially important. It also would be desirable to capture several enemy ships. 
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Attacking the convoy, not the enemy heavy covering group, was the primary mis-
sion of Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper.142
The enemy convoy would be detected by establishing U-boat patrolling lines. 
After the U-boats detected the PQ convoy, the Luftwaffe would be responsible for 
maintaining continuous contact. The Luftwaffe would also search for the enemy 
heavy group in the area of the Shetlands–Faeroes–Iceland–Jan Mayen line. If the 
Allied heavy covering group was not detected, it would be critically important to 
reconnoiter the sea area some 250 nm around the enemy convoy. The Luftwaffe 
was also tasked with reconnoitering the areas of Reykjavík, Scapa Flow, and the 
Firths of Forth and Moray in Scotland.143
On the day the combat groups sortied from Trondheim and Narvik, the 
Luftwaffe would reconnoiter the quadrant of offshore waters up to two hundred 
nautical miles from the coast running northeastward from latitude 62 degrees 
N to the longitude of North Cape. On the day of departure from the jumping-
off positions, the Luftwaffe would reconnoiter the truncated strip of waters two 
hundred nautical miles offshore from the latitude of the southern tip of Lofoten 
to the longitude of North Cape.144
In accordance with the führer’s instruction of 14 March 1942, Naval Group 
Command North requested that the 5th Air Fleet assign three squadrons of Focke- 
Wolfe (FW) 200 Condor long-range reconnaissance aircraft, four squadrons of 
Blohm & Voss (BV) 138s, and several Kettes (three-plane “chains”) of bombers 
and Junkers (Ju) 88 fighter-bombers for air reconnaissance.145 However, the 5th 
Air Fleet informed Naval Group Command North on 19 June that its request 
could not be fulfilled. In the 5th Air Fleet’s view, the attack on Convoy PQ16 in 
late May 1942 had clearly showed that the Luftwaffe itself was capable of inflict-
ing heavy losses on enemy convoys (aircraft had sunk seven ships, U-boats only 
one), but that the prerequisite for doing so was not to weaken the 5th Air Fleet’s 
already inadequate forces by assigning them other tasks.146
On 14 June, Admiral Schniewind, the fleet commander, issued a six-and-one-
half-page operation order entitled “Employment of Fleet Forces in the Northern 
Area against a PQ Convoy.” The mission was simple: an “attack on Convoy 
PQ17.”147 In keeping with the overall operational instruction, Schniewind’s 
operation order divided fleet forces into three elements: the Trondheim group, 
the Narvik group, and the U-boats (see sidebar, “German Order of Battle”). The 
Trondheim group consisted of Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper (with the fleet commander 
embarked), and five destroyers (in contrast to the two destroyers envisaged in 
Carls’s operational instruction). The Narvik group had Lützow, Admiral Scheer, 
and six destroyers. Three U-boats were stationed northeast of Iceland beginning 
on 10 June. Other available U-boats, “probably three to four,” would be in the 
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attacking position between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. Any other U-boats avail-
able later would be stationed off Bear Island. At the time the operation order was 
issued, there were only two destroyers in Trondheim (Ihn and Lody); four other 
destroyers were to be transferred from Germany to Norway within the next few 
days. There were also two or three torpedo boats in Trondheim to serve as escorts 
for the Trondheim group.148 In the skerries area of Vestfjord and in other coastal 
waters, the Germans would deploy minesweepers and submarine chasers. The U-
boats would follow a route through Andfjord. One former fishing steamer (Schiff 
31) would be employed to escort the U-boats.149
Upon issuance of a coded signal from Naval Group Command North, the fleet 
forces would sail out to their jumping-off points: 1st Combat Group from Trond-
heim to Gimsøystraumen-Vestfjord; 2nd Combat Group from Narvik to the 
northern entrance of Altafjord (the area of the skerries off Sørøya). Each group 
was to be at its jumping-off position and combat-ready within twenty-four hours 
after leaving its home base.150 About five hours prior to the sortie of the combat 
groups, Air Leader Lofoten and Air Leader North (East) would conduct recon-
naissance in the quadrant encompassed by latitude 68 degrees N and longitude 
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE
 (F = flagship)
1ST COMBAT GROUP (I KAMPFGRUPPE) (TRONDHEIM)
1 battleship: Tirpitz (F)
1 heavy cruiser: Admiral Hipper
5 destroyers:  
5th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-14 (F) Friedrich Ihn, Z-4 Richard Beitzen 
6th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-20 (F) Karl Galster, Z-10 Hans Lody, Z-6 
Theodor Riedel
2 torpedo boats: T-7, T-15
2ND COMBAT GROUP (II KAMPFGRUPPE) (NARVIK)
1 pocket battleship: Lützow
1 heavy cruiser: Admiral Scheer
8TH DESTROYER FLOTILLA
5 destroyers: Z-28 (F), Z-24, Z-27, Z-29, Z-30
1 oiler: Dithmarschen
9 U-boats: U-88, U-251, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-456, U-457, U-703
5TH AIR FLEET, LUFTWAFFE
103 Ju 88 bombers
42 He 111 torpedo bombers
15 He 115 torpedo bombers (on floats)
30 Ju 87 dive-bombers
74 reconnaissance aircraft (including FW 200 Condors and BV 138s)
Sources: Flottenchef/B.d.S., “Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkraefte im Nord-
raum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug,” p. 6; translation of the final report on operation (At-
tack on PQ17) submitted by Admiral Carls (Gruppe Nord) on the 12.7.1942 “Final Report 
on PQ17,” p. 234; Admiral Norway, B. Nr. Gkdos. 295 AI Chefs, 8 January 1942, “Die 
militaerische Lage Norwegen,” p. 30; Irving, The Destruction of Convoy PQ.17, p. 40.
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25 degrees E, up to two hundred nautical miles off the coast. Within the effective 
range of the Luftwaffe’s fighter aircraft, close air support would be provided dur-
ing all phases of the operation.151
Admiral Schniewind reiterated that the operational situation would require 
quick massing and concentrated employment of forces, leading to quick de-
struction of the enemy. The primary objective was destruction of the enemy’s 
merchant ships; the convoy’s screening ships were to be attacked only if they 
threatened the accomplishment of the operational objective. The main objective 
would be accomplished faster and more effectively if the U-boats and the Luft-
waffe provided reliable reconnaissance. The most favorable conditions for the 
attack would be in the sea area east of Bear Island, between longitudes 20 degrees 
and 30 degrees E.152
In his intent (Absicht), Admiral Schniewind directed that suppression of the 
strongest enemy force would be the responsibility of the 1st Combat Group. As 
soon as Convoy PQ17 was detected and located, the combat groups would take 
up their stations. Yet this should be carried out as late as possible, so as to reduce 
the time available for the enemy to react.153 The enemy should be attacked on 
the bow sectors and from the east; the enemy was to be encircled only when his 
combat power was broken up.154 If the enemy’s close screen consisted of no more 
than two cruisers, the attack could be conducted from two directions from the 
outset; this would result in quicker destruction of the convoy.155
Schniewind stressed that an engagement with superior enemy forces should 
be avoided. The operation should be executed quickly so as to be completed 
before an enemy force composed of battleships and carriers, and presumably 
located in the Faeroes–Iceland area, would have any opportunity to intervene. 
The operation could be canceled by the fleet commander or by order of Naval 
Group Command North.156 If enemy heavy forces were encountered during the 
attack on the convoy, the action should continue only as long as the conditions 
for success were favorable.157
On 2 June, Admiral Schmundt (Admiral Arctic) issued his operation order for 
redeployment of the pocket battleship group from Narvik to Altafjord. In addi-
tion to Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and the six destroyers, the Narvik combat group 
included the 6th S-boat Flotilla (seven S-boats) plus one supply ship.158 Close air 
support of the Narvik group through its arrival in Altafjord would be provided 
by Luftwaffe fighters based in Bardufoss and Altengaard (near Altafjord). Air 
reconnaissance would be aimed primarily at detecting enemy carriers in the 
sea quadrant between latitude 67 degrees N and longitude 26 degrees E, up to 
two hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast. Higher-density reconnais-
sance would be conducted between latitudes 69 degrees and 79 degrees N and 
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longitudes 14 degrees and 19 degrees E. Air reconnaissance would be conducted 
during the entire time of the redeployment of the Narvik group.159
On 11 June, Admiral Schmundt directed three U-boats, organized into the 
Eisteufel (“Ice Devil”) group, to take up patrol positions in the Denmark Strait to 
watch for the first sign of PQ17. These U-boats’ primary mission was detecting 
and then tracking the enemy convoy. Surface ships of destroyer size and larger 
could be attacked only when positively identified as hostile. In any uncertain situ-
ation, such as thick weather, all attacks on enemy warships were prohibited. The 
German ships were also directed not to attack enemy submarines, but otherwise 
“to act as though submarines they meet are hostile.”160
The 5th Air Fleet issued an operational order for its forces on 14 June. In gen-
eral, the Luftwaffe was responsible for air reconnaissance and the close support of 
naval forces. The subordinate commanders were directed to use all their available 
forces in attacking the PQ convoy.161 Upon executing the order for Operation 
RÖSSELSPRUNG, Luftwaffe aircraft would be employed in a three-hundred-nautical- 
mile-wide strip off the Norwegian coast. Specific area responsibilities were as fol-
lows: Air Leader North (West) from latitude 62 degrees N to a line crossing from 
the southern tip of the Lofoten area to the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen Island; 
Air Leader Lofoten from a line touching the southern tip of the Lofoten area 
to a line connecting North Cape to the southern tip of Spitsbergen; Air Leader 
North (East) from the line from North Cape to the southern tip of Spitsbergen to 
longitude 30 degrees E.162
Air Leader North (West) was responsible for providing cover for the Trond-
heim group, while Air Leader Lofoten would provide cover for the Narvik 
group.163 Fighter protection would be organized by the commander of fighters, 
Norway, in cooperation with the fleet commander at Trondheim, and Air Leader 
Lofoten in cooperation with the commander of cruisers.164 After the PQ convoy 
crossed longitude 5 degrees E, Air Leader Lofoten would be responsible for the 
sea area to three hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast from a line 
connecting the southern tip of Lofoten and the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen 
to a line connecting the southern tip of Spitsbergen and North Cape. Air Leader 
North (West) would be responsible for the sea area west and southwest of the 
Lofoten–Jan Mayen line (see map 4).165
In the meantime, discussion at a meeting between Admiral Raeder and Hitler 
on 6 June focused on operations in the Arctic. Hitler was informed about the 
pending operation in which Tirpitz was envisaged to participate. His agreement 
was lukewarm at best, but he did not reject the idea. Hitler was unclear about 
the form in which the operation would be conducted, but felt it should not be a 
risky undertaking for heavy ships in any case. After the meeting, Raeder directed 
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Admiral Krancke, OKM’s liaison to the führer’s headquarters, to explain to the 
führer once again that the SKL placed great importance on the operation, but 
that it would require sufficient Luftwaffe air cover; it could not be successful 
otherwise.166
Hitler formally approved the plan for RÖSSELSPRUNG on 9 June. However, 
Raeder failed to respond forcefully to Hitler’s remark that he now saw “great 
danger for heavy ships by the (enemy) aircraft carrier.” This meant that the en-
emy carrier must be located prior to the attack on the convoy and eliminated as 
a threat to German heavy ships. The SKL was allowed to move the Trondheim 
group to Altafjord, but then had to await orders to attack. Such orders could come 
only following Hitler’s approval. Raeder’s failure to act energetically—to confront 
Hitler and get him to lift his restrictions on the employment of the heavy ships—
was the key element in the ultimate failure of RÖSSELSPRUNG, notwithstanding 
the German forces’ overall success against Convoy PQ17.167
EXECUTION
Convoy PQ17, now consisting of thirty-six ships plus one rescue ship, sailed from 
Hvalfjord at 1600 on 27 June.168 (See maps 4 and 5.) It proceeded at six knots. The 
next day the convoy encountered heavy fog and ice floes in the Denmark Strait. 
One merchant vessel ran aground and an oiler was so heavily damaged by ice that 
it had to return. Several other ships suffered slight damage from ice.169
The Home Fleet’s Battle Force sailed from Scapa Flow on 29 June. It followed 
a course northward so as to provide support to both the PQ17 and QP13 con-
voys.170 Convoy PQ17 was fully formed at 1200 on 30 June when the long-range 
escort force (six destroyers, four corvettes, two auxiliary AA ships, and two sub-
marines) under Commander Broome plus two rescue ships joined the convoy.171 
The convoy was then some one hundred miles southwest of Jan Mayen Island.172 
The next day, the Cruiser Covering Force sailed from Seydisfjord.173
Operation E.S.’s dummy convoy sailed on 29 June. It carried out its movement 
eastward toward the Norwegian coast on 30 June and 1 July. However, the Ger-
mans’ reconnaissance aircraft did not observe it, and hence they did not react at 
all.174 The entire deception plan was a failure.
At 1640 on 30 June, Luftwaffe aircraft detected westbound Convoy QP13, 
consisting of thirty-nine ships and ten escorts, some two hundred nautical miles 
north of North Cape. However, because of heavy fog, the aircraft were unable to 
maintain contact.175 At 1050 on 1 July, Convoy QP13 was sighted by U­88 some 
250 nm northeast of Jan Mayen, but was not attacked.176
At 1615 on 1 July, U­255 was the first to detect Convoy PQ17. The reported 
position of the convoy was some sixty nautical miles east of Jan Mayen. U­255 
reported that the convoy consisted of thirty-eight steamers and ten to twelve 
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destroyers and other escort vessels. The convoy’s speed was estimated at eight 
knots; B-Dienst later confirmed this.177
At noon on 1 July, the British first noted German shadowing aircraft over 
Convoy PQ17. The weather was calm. All the Allied destroyers had been refu-
eled. The convoy was then some two hundred miles west of Bear Island.178 The 
























   
   
   






















Map 5: MOVEMENTS OF REMNANTS OF CONVOY PQ17, 4–17 JULY 1942
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3 degrees E, at a distance of some ten miles, on the afternoon of 1 July.179 The 
Cruiser Covering Force overtook Convoy PQ17 and sailed parallel to it some 
forty miles north, so as to avoid German detection.180
In the meantime, Bletchley Park learned that the Luftwaffe had detected Con-
voy PQ17.181 The OIC began to decrypt special intelligence traffic, extending 
from noon on 1 July to noon on 2 July. The OIC learned that the Narvik group 
had arrived at Altafjord that morning. It also knew that Tirpitz had sortied from 
Trondheim the previous night. This was confirmed by a British aircraft. Yet Tir­
pitz was not actually located by air reconnaissance that day.182
On 2 July, one fleet tanker and one destroyer left the convoy to join westbound 
Convoy QP13. On the evening of the same day, Convoy PQ17 ran into fog, which 
persisted until the forenoon of 3 July. Bad weather prevented Allied aircraft from 
reconnoitering the Norwegian ports for several days.183
Despite the failure to detect the Allies’ heavy surface ship group, Admiral Carls 
believed that the pending German operation, including the incorporation of 
heavy surface forces, was fully justified. Deployment of the German ships would 
start after the enemy PQ convoy crossed longitude 5 degrees E, anticipated by 
the evening of 2 July.184 Hence, in the forenoon of 2 July, Naval Group Command 
North requested that 1./SKL issue “execute” orders for the operation. This request 
was approved, and signals were sent at 1257 on 2 July. At 1200, the Trondheim 
group received an order to be in three-hour readiness.185 On the basis of reports 
from U­266, Admiral Arctic decided to keep four U-boats in continuous contact 
with the convoy. By 1400 on 2 July, a patrol line of six U-boats was established 
halfway between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands.186
As planned, the Trondheim group sortied at 2000 on 2 July for Gimsøy-
straumen, and four hours later the Narvik group left for Altafjord.187 Lützow 
ran aground in the Tjeldsund after it left Ofotfjord and did not take part in the 
operation thereafter. Likewise, three destroyers (Lody, Riedel, and Galster) of the 
Trondheim group touched ground in Gimsøystraumen and returned to Trond-
heim the next day.188 The Germans believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that the 
enemy did not notice the deployment of the Trondheim and Narvik groups.189
About midnight on 2/3 July, the U-boats and aircraft lost contact with Convoy 
PQ17.190 At 0700 on 3 July, the convoy changed course to due east to pass Bear 
Island, entering the Barents Sea. The Admiralty reported that the ice boundary 
was farther north than had been anticipated. Hence, Admiral Hamilton sug-
gested to Commander Broome that he change to a more northward course. Yet 
Broome did not entirely accept that suggestion, because he was more anxious to 
make progress eastward.191 He changed the convoy’s course only slightly north-
ward (to 021).192
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At 1600, Admiral Carls asked for a decision regarding RÖSSELSPRUNG. He 
shared his intent to deploy the Tirpitz group to Altafjord with Raeder and the 
SKL. Afterward, Admiral Krancke was directed to transmit Raeder’s approval of 
Carls’s intent to Hitler. At the same time he was instructed to explain to Hitler 
that movement of the Tirpitz group to Altafjord was only a preliminary redeploy-
ment, and did not constitute execution of Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG. In a mes-
sage sent at 1720, Carls ordered Schniewind to carry out the redeployment.193 By 
deploying the Tirpitz group to Altafjord, only a few hours would be lost if Hitler’s 
approval for the larger operation came before midday on 4 July.194
In the early morning of 3 July, the Admiralty informed CINC Home Fleet that 
a PBY-2 Catalina seaplane, backed by one B-24 Liberator heavy bomber if nec-
essary, would patrol the area between latitude 71°30ʹ N, longitude 19°10ʹ E and 
latitude 71°55ʹ N, longitude 23°40ʹ E from 1530 on 3 July to 0300 on 5 July. This 
patrol was intended to cover the approaches from Altafjord to the convoy’s route. 
Aircraft from Sullom Voe would conduct some additional searches westward of 
Lofoten. The plan also included having five Catalinas available at Arkhangelsk to 
provide searches for the convoy’s passage after it crossed longitude 35 degrees E.195
At 0130, PQ17 changed course to 091. It sailed into an area full of heavy ice 
growlers.196 At 0415, Luftwaffe aircraft detected Convoy PQ17 some eighty nauti-
cal miles northeast of Bear Island, equidistant from that island and Spitsbergen.197
At 0450, Convoy PQ17 suffered its first loss when a single enemy aircraft 
torpedoed the American merchantman Christopher Newport of seven thousand 
gross registered tons (in German documents, Bruttoregistertonnen, or BRT).198
During the day on 4 July, German aircraft maintained contact with PQ17, 
with only short interruptions caused by bad weather.199 As of 1700, the Germans 
still did not have definite information regarding the presence of an enemy heavy 
covering group with—probably—one battleship, two to three cruisers, and three 
destroyers, reported as of 1352 as being northeast of Convoy PQ17 and sailing 
on a southeasterly course.200 At 1745, Admiral Carls reported to the SKL that the 
area north of latitude 71 degrees N was not continuously observed. The 1st and 
2nd Combat Groups were in a three-hour readiness status at Altafjord. Admiral 
Carls believed that, because of the situation, Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG should be 
launched no later than 1700 on 5 July.201
In the meantime, at about 1230, the Admiralty gave Hamilton permission to 
sail east of longitude 25 degrees E should the situation require it. However, the 
Admiralty had no intelligence that justified changing Tovey’s plans. So Tovey 
qualified the Admiralty’s message by directing Hamilton that “once the convoy is 
east of 25° E or earlier at your discretion, you are to leave the Barents Sea unless 
assured by Admiralty that Tirpitz cannot be met.”202 At 1520, Hamilton signaled 
that he would stay with the convoy until the enemy surface situation had been 
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clarified, but certainly no later than 1200 on 5 July.203 These messages sent by the 
Admiralty marked the beginning of increased interference by Admiral Pound in 
the decisions and actions of his subordinate commanders during the operation, 
including bypassing Admiral Tovey to send messages directly to Tovey’s subor-
dinate Hamilton.204
During the afternoon of 4 July, British aircraft reported that Tirpitz and Ad­
miral Hipper had left Trondheim. Admiral Tovey’s force was then some 180–200 
miles northwest of Bear Island. That position was within the mutually support-
ing distance for aircraft from the carrier Victorious to respond in case of enemy 
attack on Convoy PQ17.205 At 1640, Hamilton ordered the convoy to change 
course from 090 to 045 to open distance from the enemy airfield at Banak to four 
hundred miles.206
That afternoon, Bletchley Park asserted that, although there was no verifica-
tion via photographic reconnaissance, it was “tolerably certain” that Admiral 
Scheer and Lützow had been in Altafjord since 1400 on 3 July (when it became 
known they had left Trondheim). By the afternoon of 4 July, all four German 
heavy ships might have been at sea heading toward the convoy.207
At 1809, Admiral Hamilton replied to the Admiralty that he intended to with-
draw to the westward of Convoy PQ17 at about 2200 on 4 July, upon completing 
the refueling of his destroyers.208 Another message from the Admiralty, received 
about 1839, informed Hamilton that further information might be available 
shortly, and directed him to remain with the convoy “pending further instruc-
tion.”209 At that time, Hamilton’s force was some ten to twenty miles ahead of the 
convoy.210 Some 350 miles away from the Cruiser Covering Force, the Battle Fleet 
was in a hovering position southwest of Spitsbergen.211
Over the course of the day, the weather north of Bear Island steadily improved; 
however, the cloud ceiling was low (300–500 meters), making it easier for the 
enemy aircraft to attack the convoy.212 The first attack with a few bombers came 
at 1930, but scored no hits. Luftwaffe aircraft carried out a series of more deadly 
attacks during the evening of 4 July. At about 2020, approximately twenty-three 
Heinkel (He) 111 torpedo bombers attacked the convoy. They torpedoed three 
ships; two had to be sunk, while one was damaged but was able to continue the 
voyage. Four enemy planes were shot down.213 Convoy PQ17 came out of the 
heavy Luftwaffe air attacks remarkably well—its antiair defense proved very 
effective.214
At 2325, Bletchley Park sent the Admiralty an intercepted message: “Most Se-
cret Source (Ultra): 1. Germans located westbound convoy from Russia on North 
Cape meridian P.M. yesterday July 2nd and have since lost in fog. 2. Eastbound 
convoy is expected to be sighted shortly and will be attacked in accordance with 
plan; 3. Warships are expected to move from Trondheim and Narvik (? 36) hours 
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before convoy reaches meridian 5 deg E. Main attack to be concentrated during 
passage between 15th and 30th meridian; 4. U-boats already on station close 
to Arctic. A two repeat A two.” (A2 was the level of reliability of this part of the 
report.)215
Decision to Scatter the Convoy
In the evening on 4 July, Admiral Pound personally went to Bletchley Park to get 
a close look at the stream of decrypted messages.216 The OIC received good news 
at about 1900: that the code “break-in” had been accomplished, so the decrypts 
for the twenty-four hours that had ended at noon that day could be expected very 
shortly.217 At 1918, Bletchley sent a message to Tovey that the German “CINC of 
the Fleet in Tirpitz arrived to Alta(fjord) 0900/4. Destroyers and torpedo boats 
complete with fuel at once. (Admiral) Scheer was already present at Alta(fjord) [so 
were Hipper and Lützow]. At 1623/3 two U-boats were informed their main task 
was to shadow convoy.”218 Commander Norman Denning of the OIC wanted to 
add to this message regarding Tirpitz’s arrival in Altafjord that morning and the 
directive to the destroyers and torpedo boats to refuel that the evidence indicated 
that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord. However, after some discussion with Admiral 
Pound, Denning’s added text was deleted from the message before it was sent at 
1918.219
It was not known how long refueling the destroyers would take. Although 
expected, receipt of the information about the German ships’ arrival in Altafjord 
further reinforced the view that a move against the convoy, in accordance with 
the original plan, was imminent, if not already under way.220 But Denning was 
not convinced the German ships had sailed out of Altafjord. He was supported 
in his view by his superior, Jock Clayton, the deputy director of the Intelligence 
Centre. (Clayton was a rear admiral on the retired list, but had been brought back 
onto active service as a captain.) Further support came from Harry Hinsley, the 
German traffic analyst at Bletchley. For Denning, the absence of any signal from 
Naval Group Command North to Tirpitz was an indicator that the heavy ships 
were still at Altafjord. The comparison was to Tirpitz’s foray against Convoy 
PQ12 in March. There also were no reports from the British submarines. Howev-
er, Pound gave Denning no opportunity to explain his reasons; he instead asked 
direct questions, and expected to receive short, factual answers. Among several 
other questions, Pound asked Denning whether he knew that Tirpitz was not out 
to sea.221 Denning responded that, on the basis of the experience of the German 
sortie against Convoy PQ12, the Germans would not risk Tirpitz if it might be in 
danger from the “Home Fleet, particularly its aircraft carriers.”222 He also tried to 
reassure Pound that “if Tirpitz has put out to sea you can be sure that we should 
have known very shortly afterward within four to six hours.”223
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Denning also pointed to several “negative” indicators that Tirpitz was not at 
sea. For example, Bletchley Park knew that the Germans had sighted CS 1 but had 
reported erroneously that it included a battleship. That would indicate a larger 
force, and therefore the Germans would decide not to send Tirpitz to sea. Bletch-
ley had found no evidence the Germans had detected the heavy covering force. 
Another piece of evidence that Tirpitz was not out to sea was that the Germans 
did not warn their U-boats to stay clear of the convoy. Neither had the German 
wireless telegraphy (W/T) traffic since noon shown any extraordinary activity. 
The British and Russian submarines off North Cape had reported no sightings. 
Collectively, all these “negatives” were a good indication that Tirpitz was still at 
Altafjord.224
Nonetheless, to Admiral Pound’s question, “Can you assure me that Tirpitz is 
still at anchor in Altafjord?” Denning responded, “No. I shall have information 
only after the Tirpitz has left.”225 On this question, in fact, hung the entire future 
of Convoy PQ17. Yet Denning was not in a position to give the desired assur-
ance.226 Pound then asked, “Can you at least tell me whether Tirpitz is ready to 
go to sea?” To this Denning responded, “I can at least say that she will not leave 
in the next few hours. If she were on the point of sailing, the destroyer escort 
would have preceded her and made an antisubmarine sweep. They have not been 
reported by our submarines patrolling the Altafjord.”227
A stream of decrypts began to reach the OIC at 2000. However, they provided 
no new “positive” information bearing on Admiral Pound’s question. By then, 
Clayton was due to attend a staff meeting at 2030 convened by Pound.228 (Coin-
cidentally, that meeting was held just when Convoy PQ17 was repelling enemy 
air attacks.)229 At 2031, a decrypt timed 1130 on 4 July was received at the OIC. 
It confirmed that Tirpitz had not left Altafjord as of noon on 4 July. This signal 
was included in the summarized ULTRA message timed 2110. It had informed the 
U-boats that no German surface ships were then in their operating area, and that 
the British heavy ships, if encountered, should be their main targets. However, 
this information did not change the situation, because an assumption had already 
been made that the destroyers and torpedo boats accompanying Tirpitz would 
not have completed refueling until about noon on 4 July.230
At the 2030 meeting, Admiral Pound and his staff opined that the enemy at-
tack could occur any time after 0200 on 5 July; if that happened, Admiral Ham-
ilton’s cruisers would be destroyed. They also (falsely) believed that the more 
widely merchant ships were dispersed, the better their chance of escape; once the 
alarm was given, the enemy would wish to spend no more time than necessary in 
the vicinity to pick off some ships. However, an eight-knot convoy might require 
a lot of time to disperse over a large area. The air and U-boat attacks had already 
started and were certain to continue.231
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When Clayton returned to the OIC at about 2130, he informed his staff of Ad-
miral Pound’s view that the convoy had to be dispersed because Tirpitz had sailed 
and could reach the convoy by 0200 on 5 July. However, his staff disagreed with 
that assessment. They persuaded Clayton to go back to Admiral Pound and make 
the case that Admiral Tovey should be advised instead that Tirpitz had not sailed, 
and would not sail until the Germans obtained information on the strength of the 
Allied heavy covering force.232 The naval section at Bletchley Park agreed with 
Denning’s assessment that the weight of negative evidence suggested that Tirpitz 
was still at Altafjord. However, Clayton was unable to convince Admiral Pound, 
who had already made up his mind.233
The fate of Convoy PQ17 was decided by three short messages sent by the Ad-
miralty. At 2111 on 4 July, Pound sent a signal to Hamilton (repeated to Tovey): 
“Cruiser force withdraw to westward at high speed.” Pound sent another message 
directly to Broome (repeated to Hamilton) at 2123. It read: “Owing to threat from 
surface ships convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports.” This was fol-
lowed by another at 2136: “My 2123/4th. Convoy is to scatter.”234
At the time Admiral Pound made his decision, Convoy PQ17 was some 130 
miles north-northeast of Bear Island; from North Cape, the convoy was almost 
due north (bearing 008) at a distance of about 240 miles.235 The Allied ships had 
some 450 miles before they would reach Novaya Zemlya. The Battle Force was 
then some 230 miles from the convoy and four hundred miles from the Tirpitz 
group. In other words, it was too far away from both the convoy and the enemy 
heavy ships.236
At 2215, Commander Broome passed the signal to scatter to the convoy com-
modore. The convoy was then at 75°55ʹ N, 28°52ʹ E. Broome, with his destroyers 
(other ships of the A/S screen remained with the convoy), steamed away to join 
Admiral Hamilton’s force.237 Commodore Dowding sent a message to Broome: 
“Many thanks. Goodbye and good hunting”; Broome replied, “It’s a grim business 
leaving you here.”238
At 2230, Hamilton turned his force onto a westerly course, passing southward 
of the convoy—that is, between the convoy and the probable direction from 
which the enemy would approach. The visibility was extremely variable, with nu-
merous fog patches. The Cruiser Covering Force, with the destroyers, withdrew 
westward at twenty-five knots.239
Both Hamilton and Broome were affected less by the content of Pound’s three 
messages than by the quick succession in which they were sent. The cumulative 
effect of the three signals—especially since the last signal had a more urgent pri-
ority marking than the middle one—was to imply that danger was pressing on 
them.240 They believed an attack by Tirpitz was imminent. Commander Broome 
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never forgave himself for obeying the order to scatter the convoy.241 (The third 
message’s order to “scatter” the convoy was actually merely a technical amend-
ment of the term “disperse” that had been used in the second signal; but Hamilton 
and Broome could not have known this. Later, the official Royal Navy history 
would explain the two terms in a footnote. “Disperse” meant ships should break 
formation and proceed at a convenient speed toward their destination, remain-
ing for some hours in close proximity to each other. By contrast, the term “scat-
ter” meant they should begin sailing on different bearings, in accordance with a 
scheme laid down in the convoy instructions.)242
Officially, the decision to scatter the convoy was later explained thus: Convoy 
PQ17 still had thirty ships intact. The combined threat of air and U-boat attacks 
was considerable. The convoy had reached a positon beyond the effective range 
of the Battle Fleet, even if that force was put at risk to engage Tirpitz and the en-
emy’s other heavy ships. In the Admiralty’s view, if the convoy continued on its 
way, it would be harassed by enemy U-boats and aircraft. Any enemy heavy ships 
would most likely be encountered east of North Cape. The enemy would need no 
more than ten hours to reach the convoy, and could return to safety in less than 
that time. Hence, the decision was made to scatter the convoy, with the inten-
tion of minimizing the greater losses anticipated from a surface attack compared 
with those inflicted by U-boats and aircraft. But as it turned out, the convoy lost 
twenty ships after the signal to scatter was given, and only twelve ships reached 
Russian ports.243 This reasoning was faulty because of the proven effectiveness of 
Luftwaffe bombers and Kriegsmarine U-boats in attacking individual merchant 
ships. The threat of enemy aircraft to PQ17 could be neutralized only by having 
superior airpower in the area—unlikely to be provided by the Soviets.
This was only the second time an Allied convoy had received the order to 
scatter. In the first instance, Convoy HX84 (bound from Halifax to Liverpool) 
received such an order on 5 November 1940 when Admiral Scheer was about to 
attack it. However, there were significant differences: the area in which HX84’s 
thirty-seven ships could disperse was much larger, and neither German aircraft 
nor U-boats were attacking the ships. The earlier convoy was also protected by 
only a single escort ship (Jarvis Bay). Admiral Scheer subsequently sank five ships, 
including the escort.244
The order to scatter Convoy PQ17 was given in glaring contravention of the 
“Atlantic Convoy Instructions and Orders” issued by Admiral Tovey in March 
1942. They stipulated that in the face of enemy heavy ships, convoy escorts 
should remain in the vicinity to track and, if circumstances allowed, even to 
attack enemy surface ships. Tovey in his report noted that Convoy PQ17 had 
already completed more than half its voyage (when the decision to scatter was 
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issued, PQ17 was some eight hundred miles away from Arkhangelsk) yet had 
lost only three ships. In his view, the decision to scatter was premature—and 
disastrous.245
In a personal letter to Admiral Sir Percy Noble of the Western Approaches 
Command on 12 July 1942, Admiral Tovey placed responsibility for the de-
struction of Convoy PQ17 squarely on the Admiralty for “scattering of convoy 
unnecessarily early and . . . the appalling conditions of panic suggested by the 
signals they made.” He also sent an officer “down to the Admiralty to make 
clear to them what the reactions at sea were to the information passed out 
and to those three signals in particular.” Tovey also told the Admiralty on the 
phone that he considered it “wrong for the Admiralty to issue definite orders 
to the convoy and escort.” The Admiralty should “give them information by all 
means and, if they wish make a recommendation, but leave it to the fellow on 
the spot to decide the action to be taken.” The Admiralty’s response was that it 
“consider[ed] it putting an unfair responsibility on to an officer of Commander’s 
rank.”246 However, this did not absolve Admiral Pound from bypassing Admirals 
Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey also wrote that Hamilton was entirely responsible 
for the lack of action because he “failed completely to appreciate the altered situ-
ation due to his imagining that there was still a strong likelihood of his being 
brought to action by the Tirpitz.” Hamilton also believed that the best course 
of action would have entailed the destroyer escort operating together with his 
three destroyers as part of the screen for CS 1. Tovey stated in his letter, “I deeply 
regret this mistake of his [Hamilton’s] as there was not the slightest doubt that if 
the destroyers had returned to the convoy within a reasonable time they could 
have helped materially in its defence and in rescuing survivors.”247 Yet while the 
presence of destroyers obviously would have strengthened Convoy PQ17’s AA 
defenses, it was unlikely they would have reduced significantly the number of 
merchant ships sunk.
At 0115 on 5 July, Admiral Hamilton sent the following message to Commo-
dore Dowding, addressing both the convoy’s merchant ships and the remaining 
escorts:
I know you will all be feeling as distressed as I am at having to leave that fine col-
lection of ships to find their own way to harbor. The enemy under the cover of his 
shore-based aircraft has succeeded in concentrating a far superior force in this area. 
We were therefore ordered to withdraw. We are all sorry that the good work of the 
close escort could not be completed. I hope we shall all have a chance of settling this 
score with them soon.248
Hamilton was very much concerned about the effect the escort force’s appar-
ent desertion of the merchant ships might have on morale. If he had known that 
the Admiralty had no more information regarding the enemy heavy units than 
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he himself possessed, he would have remained in a covering position until the 
convoy had widely dispersed.249 It was later claimed that Admiral Pound would 
not have made his fateful decision except for the presence of two U.S. cruisers; 
the U.S. ships were operating under British command for the first time, and he 
did not want to lose them.250
On 5 July, the weather in the operating area was variable, between four-tenths 
and fully overcast, with fog banks. Atmospheric disturbances interrupted radio 
traffic sporadically. Convoy PQ17 was continuously shadowed by Luftwaffe 
aircraft.251
At 0238, Admiral Tovey received an ULTRA message that read: “1. It is not re-
peat not known if German heavy forces have sailed from Altenfjord [Altafjord], 
but they are unlikely to have done so before 1200/4th. 2. It appears that Germans 
may be in some confusion whether a battleship is in company with CS1. Germans 
do not repeat not appear to be aware of position of C-in-C Home Fleet.”252
At 0322, the Admiralty sent a message to Admiral Miles in Moscow informing 
him that, on the basis of air reconnaissance, 
enemy heavy units have moved from Trondheim to Narvik and believed to be using a 
base in Alta fjord area from which to operate against PQ17. British forces other than 
close escort for PQ17 have been withdrawn west of Bear Island and convoy ordered 
to scatter in approximate position 76 degs North 28 degs East at 2200B/4 to proceed 
to North Russia ports. British submarines are being moved from previous patrol posi-
tions to area between latitudes 73 degs and 72 degs N and longitudes 23 degs and 32 
degs E. Catalina aircraft temporarily based in Arkhangelsk will carry out reconnais-
sance between positions 74 degs N 28 degs E and 73 degs N 32 degs E.
The Admiralty requested that Miles try to arrange with Soviet authorities for 
regular air reconnaissance of the Altafjord area, air attacks against enemy heavy 
units in harbor or at sea, and the bombing of enemy airfields, “which is of added 
importance with convoy scattered.”253
At 1625, an ULTRA message was sent to Rear Admiral Richard Bevan, the 
senior British naval officer in north Russia, advising him to anticipate that “most 
likely time of enemy surface attack is now tonight 5/6 July or early hours of to-
morrow 6th July.” The “enemy may strike on 065 degs direction from North Cape. 
Submarine and Catalina aircraft might sight enemy. Request striking force may 
be at short notice from 2000 today 5th July.”254
In the meantime, German air reconnaissance reported at 0655 the presence of 
the enemy force, composed of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, one (possible) battle-
ship, four heavy cruisers, eight destroyers, and two torpedo boats, proceeding on 
a westerly course at fifteen knots.255 This force was some five hundred miles away 
from the convoy, which had already scattered. For the Germans, this confirmed 
the accuracy of the aircraft report concerning the enemy cruiser force received 
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the previous afternoon (on 4 July) to the effect that no enemy heavy units were 
anywhere near the convoy. It was this report that enabled Admiral Raeder to get 
Hitler’s final permission for the Tirpitz foray.256
During the forenoon of 5 July, the operational situation for the Germans was 
mixed. On the positive side, the convoy had been dissolved, probably because of 
the aerial and U-boat attacks. Most of the ships were still to be found within an 
area approximately sixty nautical miles on a side; however, the convoy’s composi-
tion could not be precisely determined, because of the large size of this dispersal 
area.257 The Germans mistakenly believed that the enemy cruiser group had 
moved westward because it had lost a heavy cruiser. The heavy covering force 
was located well to the west of Bear Island, and was making full use of fog banks 
to disguise its location and makeup. The distance from this group to the convoy 
was 450 nm, and to North Cape also about 450 nm. This distance was sufficient 
that there would be minimal danger to the German forces if they approached 
the convoy unobserved and got the engagement over quickly. If the enemy heavy 
covering forces were spotted during the German forces’ approach to the convoy, 
there would be sufficient time to turn away.258 In sum, the Allied heavy covering 
force was too far away to pose a threat to the 1st and 2nd Combat Groups moving 
to attack Convoy PQ17.259
General conditions for an attack by the German heavy ships on 5 July were less 
favorable than they had been on the previous day. The convoy was farther away—
the area of combat would be eastward of North Cape. And during the withdrawal 
phase, the distance to the enemy heavy forces would be steadily reduced. But the 
risk was still bearable.260
Admiral Carls believed that (1) if any enemy battleships close to the convoy 
were damaged by U-boats and aircraft by 1200, he would be justified in carry-
ing out the operation regardless of the presence of an enemy carrier; and (2) the 
carrier aircraft would have less of an impact if the convoy was attacked north of 
latitude 72 degrees N. The latest time for carrying out RÖSSELSPRUNG was 1300 
on 5 July; otherwise, the attack would take place too close to the Russian coast.261 
Carls essentially requested that Admiral Raeder issue the code word for execut-
ing the operation, with no option to cancel those orders later (Rückrufbefehle). 
However, Raeder refused to do so, because of Hitler’s precondition that the 
enemy carrier must be taken out of the equation first. This was communicated 
to Admiral Carls at 0915. Thus, everything depended on the quality of the air 
reconnaissance. The enemy was unwilling to operate its heavy covering group 
within the effective range of the Luftwaffe torpedo bombers and heavy bombers. 
According to Admiral Carls, the enemy carrier group had already been at sea on 
1 July, and he doubted it could continue to operate for too long. It was possible 
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that the heavy covering group would be withdrawn to refuel and take up a wait-
ing position. Therefore he did not believe the enemy carrier group would pose a 
threat to the German heavy ships.262
Hitler finally gave permission for the operation during the forenoon of 5 July. 
This was the latest favorable time for the attack on the convoy, before it entered 
Russian coastal waters. The code word for the execution was issued at 1137. At 
the same time, Naval Group Command North took over operational control of 
the U-boats operating in Arctic waters.263 Raeder communicated to Carls that the 
conditions for the execution of RÖSSELSPRUNG did exist unless the enemy carrier 
was detected or the German combat groups were detected by enemy aircraft. The 
führer’s approval for the operation was transmitted to Admiral Carls at 1140. 
Forces that had been in one-hour combat readiness after 0900 were directed at 
1052 to be in immediate readiness to sortie. At 1141, the combat groups received 
the requisite code word from Naval Group Command North. At 1230, Naval 
Group Command North took over control of the entire operation. It directed 
Admiral Schniewind to sortie by North Cape, passing Breisund and escorted by 
minesweepers.264
At 1700, the Soviet submarine K21 reported (inaccurately) the presence of Tir­
pitz, Admiral Scheer, and eight destroyers at latitude 71°25ʹ N, longitude 23°40ʹ 
E, or some forty-five miles southwest of North Cape, sailing on a northeasterly 
course. The same submarine claimed to have hit Tirpitz with two torpedoes.265 
However, British intelligence believed that, in view of subsequent sightings, 
these claims seemed “improbable.”266 Despite the Soviet claims, Tirpitz had not 
in fact been hit; nevertheless, K21’s sighting report was of great value to Admiral 
Tovey.267
At 1816, Allied reconnaissance aircraft reported eleven ships at latitude 
71°31ʹ N, longitude 27°10ʹ E on a northeasterly course at ten knots. The British 
submarine Unshaken (P54) shifted its original station farther east, and at 2029 it 
reported Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper, escorted by at least six destroyers, in latitude 
71°30ʹ N, longitude 28°40ʹ E, steering course 060 at twenty-two knots.268
At 1700, the Germans received an important message, an interception of an 
Allied submarine sighting report of two battleships at latitude 71°25ʹ N, longi-
tude 23°40ʹ E, sailing a northeasterly course. Along with the intercepted 1816 
message, these reports left no doubt that the enemy had detected the German 
combat groups.269 Also, starting at 1945 the enemy systematically began to dis-
rupt radio communications on all channels, making the transmission of orders 
difficult.270 A report from B-Dienst at 2006 indicated that enemy reconnaissance 
aircraft had sighted German combat groups in the North Cape area at 1700 and 
1816.271
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RÖSSELSPRUNG Is Canceled
Naval Group Command North concluded at 2000 on 5 July that the enemy heavy 
group was in generally the same position as on 4 July. The enemy heavy cruis-
ers were detected at 1745 on 5 July sailing a westerly course. This group was 
observed until 2010, when it disappeared in fog. The Germans assumed that the 
enemy heavy covering group would have to reduce distance from the German 
combat groups to about two hundred nautical miles to attack, but not less than 
that, because of the danger of attacks from Luftwaffe aircraft based in northern 
Norway. This meant that RÖSSELSPRUNG could only be carried out within the 
time window from 2000 on 5 July to 0200 next morning. Although the attack on 
PQ17 might have beneficial psychological effects for the Germans, its chances of 
success in attacking a now widely dispersed convoy were small. Hence, it was not 
worth justifying the risk of engaging an enemy carrier force.272 Carls believed that 
once the enemy had sighted the German combat groups, the entire operation had 
to be aborted. A clash with the enemy heavy covering group must be avoided in 
any case; the possibility that the enemy carrier might cut off the combat groups’ 
withdrawal was unacceptable.273
Raeder and Carls conferred by phone at 2035 and 2103. They agreed that, giv-
en where the enemy heavy covering group had been sighted, the enemy would be 
able to bring it to bear against the German combat groups during their return to 
base.274 On that basis, Raeder made the decision to abandon the entire operation; 
at 2132, Admiral Carls sent a message to Admiral Schniewind aborting RÖSSEL-
SPRUNG.275 Schniewind was directed to sail with Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, Admiral 
Hipper, and five destroyers for North Cape, and afterward through the “Inner 
Leads” (the channel between Norway’s mainland and the outer island chain) to 
Vestfjord. Operational control of the U-boats was turned over to Admiral Arc-
tic.276 Lützow, two destroyers, and the torpedo boats were directed to Trondheim, 
and were put under the control of Admiral Arctic.277
Raeder’s decision was based on Hitler’s view that Germany could not afford to 
put its few remaining heavy ships at risk. Because the Allied air reconnaissance 
had prematurely detected the German combat groups, it was highly possible that 
the Tirpitz group would be attacked by enemy carrier aircraft. Another factor in 
Raeder’s decision was that the convoy had already widely dispersed, and the risk 
that would be entailed in employing the fleet forces would not be commensurate 
with the remaining mission elements—i.e., finishing off the enemy convoy would 
be better left to the U-boats and aircraft.278
At 0230 on 6 July, the Admiralty sent a message to Convoy PQ17’s escorts stat-
ing that an “attack by enemy surface forces is probable in next few hours. Your 
primary duty is to avoid destruction to enable you to return to scene of attack and 
pick up survivors after enemy have retired.”279 Shortly afterward, the Admiralty 
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radioed that, in case of attack by the enemy’s surface ships, when it was clear “that 
enemy heavy ships have retired to westward, request you will arrange for a search 
for survivors by all available means including my Catalinas in north Russia not 
required for searching and shadowing enemy.”280
At 1946, the Admiralty sent a message to the PQ17 escort that the “risk of 
attack by enemy surface vessels is now greatly lessened.” The escort vessels were 
directed to return to pick up survivors.281 Those unable to do so but in contact 
with several merchantmen should form them into a group and escort them to 
Yokanga “unless otherwise directed by S.B.N.O. North Russia [Rear Admiral 
Bevan].” Escorts short on fuel should proceed to Arkhangelsk, where they would 
be refueled. The two auxiliary AA ships should not run the risk of taking part in 
rescue operations, but instead should proceed without delay to Arkhangelsk.282
At 1040 on 6 July, Admiral Hamilton’s force joined the Battle Fleet. The weath-
er in the area was unfavorable for air reconnaissance. Tovey felt that nothing was 
to be gained by steering northeastward. Hence, Hamilton’s cruisers and eight 
destroyers were detached to Seydisfjord at 1230 on 6 July. Shortly afterward, the 
Battle Fleet turned southward. All the ships reached their home bases on 8 July.283
In the meantime, the Germans continued their efforts to detect and attack 
what was left of Convoy PQ17. On the morning of 6 July, the convoy’s remnants 
were dispersed east of longitude 40 degrees E and over a 300-by-60 km (186 × 37 
miles) area. The U-boats at that point had no contact with the remnants of PQ17. 
They were directed instead by Admiral Arctic to search for enemy ships in the 
area between longitudes 42 degrees and 48 degrees E. Two U-boats returned to 
Narvik during the night of 6/7 July; two other boats were under way to Kirkenes, 
where they would arrive on the evening of 6 July.284
On 7 July, Commodore Dowding (who survived the sinking of his ship by a 
U-boat on 5 July) organized a convoy of five merchant ships plus one rescue ship 
at Matochkin Shar (Strait), Novaya Zemlya, to head for Arkhangelsk. They were 
accompanied by two auxiliary AA ships, three corvettes, three minesweepers, 
and three trawlers, all remnants of Convoy PQ17’s escort force. They formed up 
and sailed out on the evening of 7 July.285 
Admiral Bevan’s plan was to send one British corvette to reinforce the escorts 
and bring the ships to Arkhangelsk by transiting close to the east coast of Novaya 
Zemlya, south of Kolguyev Island, and around Cape Kanin. Bevan also informed 
the Admiralty that “C. in C. White Sea [commander of the White Sea Flotilla] 
is requesting C. in C. Northern Fleet that additional cover may be provided by 3 
Soviet Union destroyers. Catalina leaves for reconnaissance 1000 B 8th. 4 more 
Flying boats approaching Svyatoy Nos.”286
The ensuing voyage was full of accidents. The ships encountered heavy fog and 
ran into a solid ice barrier south of Byelushya Bay, Novaya Zemlya (the British 
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had not known about the ice, but the Germans did). This forced several ships to 
head for Yokanga anchorage. Admiral Bevan was completely unaware that the 
remnants of PQ17 had left Matochkin Shar until some ships reported entering 
Yokanga. This was because the Soviet Northern Fleet failed to inform Bevan 
about the ships’ departure. The Soviets also provided no information to Bevan 
about ice conditions.287
During the night of 8/9 July, German aircraft reconnoitered the area west of 
Novaya Zemlya, the Kanin Peninsula, other western waterways, the piers at Yo-
kanga, the Murmansk–Leningrad railway, and airfields in the Byelomorsk area 
(Onega Bay).288 Because of heavy fog, they did not fly north of latitude 72 degrees 
N on 8 or 9 July. However, at 1151 on 9 July German aircraft reported the pres-
ence of a group of five enemy merchant vessels. Attacks by thirty-eight aircraft 
in two groups from 1st Group, 30th Air Wing (I./KG 30) at Banak followed. The 
Germans claimed that one seven-thousand-ton vessel and another of eight thou-
sand tons were damaged. Because of fog at Banak upon the flyers’ return, I./KG 
30 was diverted to Petsamo, while II./KG 30 reached Banak.289
During the night of 9/10 July, some forty German bombers carried out a 
high-level attack against these ships for four hours, ending at 0230. The Luft-
waffe received information on the convoy from U-boats operating in the area. 
Two Allied merchant ships were sunk, while four enemy aircraft were believed 
to be shot down. The surviving ships reached Arkhangelsk on 11 July.290 Also on 
10 July, German aircraft attacked docking facilities and fuel tanks at Rost and 
airfields in the Murmansk area, and suppressed coastal batteries on the Rybachy 
Peninsula.291
On 16 July, Commodore Dowding returned with three corvettes to organize 
another convoy from the remnants of PQ17 and bring it to Arkhangelsk. He 
arrived after a stormy voyage to Byelushya Bay on 19 July, where five merchant 
ships were at anchor plus two British trawlers and one Soviet icebreaker. Another 
merchant ship joined the convoy at Moller Bay, Novaya Zemlya, on the morning 
of 21 July. The convoy’s defenses were reinforced by one auxiliary AA ship, one 
corvette, two minesweepers, and two Soviet destroyers on 22 July. Two days later, 
the convoy arrived in Arkhangelsk having suffered no losses.292
To sum up: between 2 and 10 July, the 5th Air Fleet employed 130 Ju 88s, 
forty-three He 111s (twenty aborted), and twenty-nine He 115s (six aborted) in 
attacking Convoy PQ17. In many cases, U-boats were able to sink heavily dam-
aged ships initially hit by the Luftwaffe. The 5th Air Fleet stopped its attacks on 
Convoy PQ17 only when no further ships were sighted.293 German losses in these 
attacks were only five aircraft: one BV 138, two He 111s, one He 115, and one FW 
200.294 In the aftermath of their attacks, the Germans grossly exaggerated their 
successes. Largely from B-Dienst radio intercepts, they claimed that between 4 
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and 11 July their aircraft and U-boats had sunk thirty-seven ships of 231,090 
(actually 244,028) combined BRT.295 They claimed positive information that U-
boats had sunk sixteen ships of 107,947 combined BRT, while the 5th Air Fleet 
had sunk twenty-one ships of 136,081 combined BRT.296
The true losses were heavy enough without exaggeration. The attacks by the 
Luftwaffe and the U-boats resulted in the destruction of twenty-two merchant 
ships (fourteen American) of Convoy PQ17’s thirty-four that tried to get through 
(or 65 percent).297 The ships sunk carried 430 tanks, 210 aircraft, and 3,350 motor 
vehicles, plus 99,316 tons of other cargo.298
The almost total destruction of Convoy PQ17 had significant military, psycho-
logical, and political effects. In purely military terms, the Germans accomplished 
a major tactical objective. The decision of the British chiefs of staff on 13 July to 
recommend that convoys “should not be sent to Northern Russia in present cir-
cumstances” had a negative operational effect. The Royal Navy suffered a major 
loss of confidence regarding its ability to protect convoys to northern Russia.299 
Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin on 17 July informing him that further convoys 
to northern Russia would be postponed. This, in turn, had major political and 
psychological consequences. Stalin became intensely suspicious about Churchill’s 
true motives. He believed that Britain might seek a separate peace with Nazi 
Germany.300
CONCLUSION
The decision to send badly needed supplies to the Soviet Union was made purely 
for political and strategic reasons. Admirals Pound and Tovey were opposed to 
that decision. Their main concern seems to have been the lack of adequate forces 
to support such an effort, and the possibility of large losses in naval ships and 
personnel. (The Soviets, for whatever reasons, were either unable or unwilling 
to provide much support in defense of the Allied convoys.) The British admirals’ 
concerns were well founded. Not only was the convoy route to northern Russia 
long, but it was also open to deadly attacks by the Luftwaffe and U-boats. The 
problem was compounded by the prevalence of bad weather and ice conditions, 
and the long daylight hours in summer. Yet in retrospect, the decision to help the 
Soviet Union was sound, and fully justified strategically. It played a critical role 
in the Soviet ability to withstand the German offensive on the eastern front in 
1941–42.
The Allied operational command organization seemed fairly simple and 
straightforward. However, for some reason the Home Fleet’s area of responsibil-
ity was not formally defined. The Home Fleet was the single largest British naval 
command available for keeping the Kriegsmarine in check. However, its forces 
were never adequate, because of competing demands from other theaters. In 
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fact, it was forced repeatedly to provide ships to other fleets. The Home Fleet was 
primarily composed of heavy surface ships and carriers; it lacked an adequate 
number of smaller ships suitable for convoying duties. That was why Western 
Approaches Command provided most of the A/S escorts for Allied convoys to 
northern Russia. The U.S. Navy also reinforced the Home Fleet by sending its 
newly formed TF 39.
The German operational command organization in Norway and the adjacent 
area was highly unsatisfactory. No multiservice command was established in that 
theater throughout the entire war. This meant that each service prepared and ex-
ecuted its own operational plans. An effective employment of naval forces and the 
Luftwaffe was almost entirely dependent on close cooperation among mid- and 
low-level commanders. For the Kriegsmarine, the problem was not made much 
easier by having the Fleet Command forces within the area of responsibility of 
Naval Group Command North. In addition, the headquarters of Naval Group 
Command North was located too far away from its subordinate commands in 
Norway. To make things worse, the Kriegsmarine had a penchant for making 
numerous changes, in both titles and the subordination relationships among the 
various forces. This was especially the case with the Fleet Command. Another 
major problem was the insufficient freedom of action allowed to subordinate 
naval commanders, the result of too-close supervision by higher commanders. 
This was especially the case in the relationship between Naval Group Command 
North and Admiral Arctic.
Both the Allies and the Germans, in preparing plans for and employing their 
respective forces in combat, were greatly dependent on having well-organized 
and effective intelligence apparatuses. British naval intelligence proved to be 
much more effective because of the superb abilities of the decoders at Bletchley 
Park, especially at decrypting German naval messages. Despite widely held be-
liefs to the contrary, this task was never easy, because the German codes were 
difficult to crack; there were many times when Bletchley and the OIC were in 
the dark about German intentions, plans, and movements. This was especially 
the case for a large part of 1942, during which Bletchley Park was unable to read 
coded messages to U-boats.
German Naval Intelligence was well organized and quite effective at provid-
ing naval commanders with fairly accurate and timely intelligence on the Allied 
OOB, convoys, and the losses inflicted by U-boats and the Luftwaffe. B-Dienst 
was especially effective at reading messages regarding the composition, departure 
dates, and routes of Allied convoys. This proved invaluable to the Kriegsmarine, 
and its U-boat arm in particular.
The Allies developed their plans for convoying to northern Russia over time. 
Although some changes in plans were made for each convoy, the pattern was 
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consistent. The fact was that the geography and ice conditions in the Barents Sea 
gave planners little or no choice in selecting routes and defense forces for each 
convoy. Admirals Pound and Tovey were strongly opposed to sending convoys 
during the summer months, when they were highly vulnerable to attacks by 
enemy aircraft and U-boats; yet they had to execute the decisions made by the 
British and U.S. governments. Purely political reasons dominated Allied planning 
for convoys to northern Russia.
The German plans for Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG were the result of numerous 
studies prepared by all the major naval commands in Norway concerning the 
possibility of employing heavy surface ships and U-boats in the Arctic. As usual 
in the German military, the operational-level command issued an operational 
instruction, while subordinate commanders issued operation orders. However, 
the lack of joint-force commanders resulted in the lack of a single plan for the 
employment of heavy surface ships, U-boats, and Luftwaffe aircraft.
The operational instruction issued by Naval Group Command North on 4 
June envisaged employing both the Trondheim and Narvik groups of surface 
ships. A major flaw in the plan was the unnecessarily complicated command 
relationship under which the Trondheim group was subordinate to Naval Group 
Command North, while the Narvik group was under Admiral Arctic. Only dur-
ing the second phase of the operation were both groups under the operational 
command of Naval Group Command North.
A major prerequisite for the success of RÖSSELSPRUNG was comprehensive air 
reconnaissance of the potential operating area, followed by the weakening of the 
enemy heavy covering force. This would have meant the 5th Air Fleet’s acquies-
cence to the request by Naval Group Command North to assign more aircraft for 
reconnaissance—but the 5th Air Fleet simply refused to do so.
But perhaps the single greatest problem was Hitler’s unwillingness to risk 
any heavy surface ship to attack enemy convoys. This risk aversion, in essence, 
precluded any effective employment of the German heavy surface ships based in 
Norway, most notably to prevent the Allies from running convoys to northern 
Russia. The German ships retained value only to the extent that they inhibited a 
possible enemy amphibious landing and invasion.
Convoy PQ17 went ahead as planned. Although detected and tracked by 
German U-boats and aircraft, it suffered almost no losses until the evening of 4 
July. Admiral Pound’s decision to “scatter” the convoy at that point was perhaps 
understandable, but cannot be considered sound. No convoy should be left to 
proceed independently without its direct and distant covers. If the convoy was 
faced with destruction by a superior force, it should have been directed to with-
draw temporarily to a safer distance or return to a safe port. Admiral Pound also 
violated some of the basic principles of sound naval command and control by 
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directly interfering with and bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey’s 
criticism of the Admiralty was fully justified. The higher commander should 
normally leave the subordinate commander sufficient freedom of action for him 
to exercise the initiative in the course of an operation.
Positioning of the Home Fleet’s Battle Fleet in relation to Convoy PQ17 on 5 
July was clearly unsound: it remained too far away to provide distant cover and 
support to the convoy, and also too far away to engage the enemy heavy surface 
group effectively.
Admiral Raeder’s decision to cancel RÖSSELSPRUNG on the evening of 5 July 
was unavoidable because there was little to gain from using heavy surface ships to 
try to destroy the widely dispersed ships of (the former) Convoy PQ17. The time 
to employ those heavy surface ships was prior to 5 July. Yet doing so was clearly 
impossible, given the strictness of Hitler’s conditions for employing Tirpitz and 
its ilk. Yet Tirpitz’s presence in Altafjord and the ever-present possibility of its 
attacking PQ17 were the most important factors in the fateful decision to scatter 
Convoy PQ17, with the subsequent horrendous losses of Allied merchant ships 
from Luftwaffe and U-boat attacks.
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